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America has a lengthy history with irregular warfare.  The nation was born of an 
insurgency and remained committed to such conflict over the centuries, from the 
American Revolution in the eighteenth century, the Indian Wars in the nineteenth 
century, the Philippines in the twentieth century, and Iraq and Afghanistan in the 
twentieth-first century.  Although the U.S. has learned a great deal from centuries of 
fighting irregular war, the lessons were continuously learned and forgotten, indicating 
America‘s distaste of such conflict.  Yet, as America continues to fight irregular wars, 
doctrine and policy have taken shape.  However, whereas doctrine and policy may exist, 
our practices remain very similar to the past, often involving inconsistent and ad hoc 
measures.  Yet, new methodology emerged which takes ―best practices‖ from centuries of 
irregular war.  This methodology calls for a fundamental change in how the U.S. 
approaches irregular war, illustrating the need to focus on local level instability and 
conflict drivers.  Further, this methodology not only can be employed in the field of 
conflict, but also can help mitigate conflict before it becomes war.  In order to learn from 
America‘s history in irregular war, and embrace methodology based on historical ―best 
practices,‖ America must move from merely changing its policy to changing how it 
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Framing the Challenges of Irregular Conflict 
While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared to 
innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in the rear, 
ultimately exhaust him.  They make themselves as unendurable as a group 
of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic 
proportions, they will find their victim is not only exhausted but 
practically perishing.—Mao Tse-tung, 1937 
 
America has a long history with irregular war with historical involvement in 
dozens of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.  America‘s very existence is rooted in 
insurgency warfare and this form of conflict has never completely disappeared 
throughout America‘s two and a half centuries-long history, seeing only ebbs in 
prominence and national attention.  The American people‘s first national experience with 
insurgency and counterinsurgency was the American Revolution as a struggle for 
independence from the colonial hegemony of the British Empire.  The American war for 
independence was in essence a political war fought amongst the people for deeply 
political reasons—making it an archetypical insurgency by current American standards.1  
Yet, this was merely one American experience dealing with insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, contemporarily referred to as irregular warfare.  As we will see, 
                                                 
1
 The current military doctrine, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency states: ―Political power is the central issue in 
insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority 
as legitimate. Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), informational (including 
appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and economic—to overthrow the existing 
authority. This authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. 
Counterinsurgents, in turn, use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging 
government and reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging.‖  See Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2009). 
2 
 
America‘s experience in this form of conflict, whether as insurgents or counterinsurgents, 
is lengthy and complex.      
Aside from America‘s formative years rooted in insurgency, America also has a 
lengthy history in which the United States was a primary actor in counterinsurgency 
warfare.  In fact, America‘s history as being the counterinsurgent force is more extensive 
than often acknowledged.  By modern definition, counterinsurgency is essentially the 
antithesis of insurgency warfare, being as deeply political and nuanced as the 
insurgencies they seek to counter.  To illustrate these many nuances, the U.S. Army 
describes the population-based intricacies of counterinsurgency: 
At its heart, counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the 
population. This support can be achieved or lost through information engagement, 
strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear, or violence.  
This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety 
and security of the population. However, military units alone cannot defeat an 
insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering and solving the population‘s 
underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction with the current 
arrangement of political power. Dealing with diverse issues such as land reform, 
underemployment, oppressive leadership, or ethnical tensions places a premium 
on tactical leaders who can not only close with the enemy, but also negotiate 
agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies and other nations, restore basic 
services, speak the native (a foreign) language, orchestrate political deals, and get 
―the word‖ on the street.2 
 
Among the most salient points this paragraph highlights is that insurgency and 
counterinsurgency (i.e., the armed struggle between the two) are extraordinarily complex 
and the tactics and strategies are timeless.  In short, although these conflicts have become 
more complex and the tactics and strategies more sophisticated, the concept itself is 
nothing new.   
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 Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 2009). ix. 
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Despite new doctrine, policy, and theory, governments and those competing for or 
against the government in power have always been concerned with gaining popular 
support and evoking group sentiments within the target population, regardless of methods 
utilized to win or defeat peoples.  A clear distinction should be made, however, that 
whereas the concept of population-based irregular war is timeless, the tactics and 
strategies have evolved substantially.  Over the past few decades, insurgencies have 
evolved from merely guerrilla warfare, devoid of a political base, to that of sophisticated 
political warfare utilizing violence as well as using the leverage of public support  as the 
key tools in winning power.   
The U.S. Army manual goes on to point out a particularly salient issue in political 
warfare that insurgencies and counterinsurgencies focus the majority of their attention on 
the population, rather than merely the enemy.  Stated more formally, these types of 
conflicts are more frequently ―population-centric‖ rather than merely ―enemy-centric.‖  
For the successful insurgent or counterinsurgent, simply killing the enemy cannot be the 
top priority.  Popular support must be drained from the enemy.  This is of course what 
makes such forms of warfare deeply political.  To illustrate, ―enemy-centric‖ conflicts 
tend to be more conventional conflicts, such as WWII where population sentiment was 
dealt with as a byproduct of larger conventional military efforts.  In other words, soldiers 
viewed population sentiment as relatively irrelevant while undertaking the task of 
fighting major battles.  These important points—that irregular war is primarily about 
gaining political support and that such warfare tends to be focused on the population—set 
irregular war apart from conventional war. 
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Irregular warfare, such as counterinsurgency and insurgency, is not a rarity in 
either contemporary or historical periods of conflict.  Historically, irregular conflict is far 
more statistically prominent when compared to conventional forms of conflict.  Despite 
the overwhelming amount of attention on conventional wars, where armies fight through 
traditional forms of combat (e.g., battle for air superiority, centralized command and 
control, uniformed armies fighting for terrain, large naval sea battles, etc.),  conventional 
war has not been predominant statistically since formal tracking began.  Over the 
previous two and a half centuries, ―small wars‖ have been at least as important, if not 
more so, than well-known larger conventional wars (e.g., examples of conventional war 
include the American Civil War and the Great World Wars).  What should be clear is that 
irregular war has been and will likely remain a vital part of the American war experience.   
 
Frequency and Relevance of Irregular Conflict: 
The American Perspective 
The United States has engaged frequently in irregular conflict.  Studies of conflict 
analysis that quantify the numbers of conventional versus nonconventional wars highlight 
that counterinsurgency and insurgency warfare is in fact much more ―typical‖ than 
widely-known larger conventional wars.    Many conflict scholars point out that over the 
past sixty years, irregular warfare—including insurgency and counterinsurgency—has 
actually become the dominant form of war, not only in terms of frequency but also in 
terms of long-range political relevance and consequence.  Conflict scholars highlight: 
―Within the 464 conflicts recorded on the Correlates of War database since 1815, we can 
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identify 385 in which a state was fighting a non-state actor.‖3  By definition, irregular 
warfare is characterized by states fighting nonstate entities.  Thus, statistically, 
conventional wars (i.e., conflict predominantly being state on state) reflect approximately 
only one-quarter of global conflicts since 1815.   
America has followed a similar pattern as the global community, engaging more 
frequently in irregular conflict.  As counterinsurgents, the U.S. has fought, to varying 
degrees of success, a wide array of such conflicts, including wars against Native 
Americans, Mexican guerrillas, Islamist insurgents, and even our own insurgents—such 
as during the Whiskey Rebellion and again during the Civil War against secessionist 
guerrillas (e.g., ―Mosby‘s Rangers‖).  As the insurgents and guerrillas, both sanctioned 
and otherwise, Americans have fought against the British, Native Americans, and our 
own—to name only a few.  Further, we have also assisted on frequent occasion foreign 
counterinsurgents and insurgents via Special Forces (i.e., Foreign Internal Defense or 
FID) and similar classified and covert operations.  Thus, America is no stranger to 
irregular conflict.   
 
Applicability and Effectiveness of Irregular Conflict 
The phenomenon of irregular war occurs for a primary overarching reason—that 
given the right environment and circumstances, irregular war affords the best chance of 
success when a weaker foe comes into armed conflict with a more conventionally 
powerful adversary.  To illustrate, U.S. military doctrine states: 
The contest of internal war is not ―fair‖; many of the ―rules‖ favor insurgents. 
That is why insurgency has been a common approach used by the weak against 
                                                 
3




the strong. At the beginning of a conflict, insurgents typically hold the strategic 
initiative. Though they may resort to violence because of regime changes or 
government actions, insurgents generally initiate the conflict. Clever insurgents 
strive to disguise their intentions. When these insurgents are successful at such 
deception, potential counterinsurgents are at a disadvantage. A coordinated 
reaction requires political and military leaders to recognize that an insurgency 
exists and to determine its makeup and characteristics. While the government 
prepares to respond, the insurgents gain strength and foster increasing disruption 
throughout the state or region. The government normally has an initial advantage 
in resources; however, that edge is counterbalanced by the requirement to 
maintain order and protect the population and critical resources. Insurgents 
succeed by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere; the government fails unless it 
maintains a degree of order everywhere.4 
 
As illustrated in the previous paragraph, paradoxically, a well-organized and 
determined insurgency has several distinct advantages when confronting a conventionally 
superior opponent.  Equally important for the counterinsurgent, therefore, is a keen 
understanding of the population as the knowledge of the human scene now becomes the 
determining ―terrain‖ for achieving victory.  Physical terrain is of distant importance 
following human terrain.  
As highlighted, the frequency of such conflict trending toward irregular conflict is 
not the result of a mere accident of fate or without reason and thought. Rather, this trend 
is reflective of a deeper change in overall strategy by state and nonstate conflict actors.  
Both state and nonstate actors now realize that they need not meet in battle conducted 
according to historical conventions —such as traditional ―force on force‖ in open 
battlefields.  Further, the insurgents need not have the most advanced fleet of naval ships 
or stealth fighters.  Such weaponry and technology are expensive, time consuming to 
acquire and be trained on, and outright unachievable for almost all insurgents. Of most 
importance, however, are also unnecessary in order to win in insurgent warfare.  
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 Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-2. 
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Therefore, armed with the knowledge of contemporary case studies and evolving 
literature, innovative and sophisticated approaches to irregular conflict continue to 
emerge.   
With the old adages of conventional conflict thrown aside often in favor of 
irregular approaches to war, the focus has shifted to winning via irregular means against 
often conventionally superior adversaries. To illustrate, despite common convention, 
frequently a successful insurgent seeks to turn the opponent‘s ―strengths‖ against their 
adversary, while simultaneously attempting to turn their own ―weaknesses‖ into 
strengths.  Although a nuanced concept like something from the pages of Sun Tzu, it is a 
commonly held principle among historical and contemporary insurgents.  Translated into 
practical applicability, it simply says to turn large powerful armies into slow, reactive, 
and confused organizations while maintaining the advantage of surprise and deceit.  
Regarding technology, it seeks to bait the counterinsurgents into overreacting to insurgent 
attacks, ultimately alienating them from the human terrain and resulting in the shift of 
popular support to the insurgents. As a starting point, the insurgent can accomplish his 
strategy only by ―winning‖ the population, perhaps slowly at first but consistently over 
time.  Ultimately there are two choices in how this is accomplished: the utilization of 
terror or other forms of coercion (often referred to as the ―kinetic‖ approach, using harsh 
methods), or persuading the population to join their effort, often performed by building 
rapport and distributing propaganda (nonkinetic approach, by establishing trust and 
kinship with the population).  Similarly, the counterinsurgent force utilizes similar 
approaches and choices, essentially attempting to outperform the insurgents at this game, 




The Value of ―Human Terrain‖ 
As mentioned, ―human terrain‖ is the critical terrain in insurgency and 
counterinsurgency warfare.  As often attributed to the highly successful Chinese 
insurgent leader, Mao Tse-tung, the population becomes the battlefield that must be 
captured.  In Mao‘s case, he spared no expense in building rapport with the population, 
illustrated by his dictate to ―…aid the popular masses…help them to gather the harvest or 
cultivate their lands and send our army doctors to prevent their epidemics or treat the 
peoples‘ ailments…hold joint entertainment sessions for the soldiers and the 
people…smooth over any feelings of alienation between the army and the people.‖5 This 
approach is in stark contrast to conventional thinking of war which focuses on capturing 
and holding physical terrain.  In conventional conflict, the population is merely a single 
ancillary factor when capturing physical terrain and receives relatively little attention.  In 
contrast, within the doctrine and common practice of irregular conflict, physical terrain 
can be seen as a negative factor if the captured physical terrain serves only to extend the 
reach of counterinsurgent forces beyond their means to properly defend themselves, the 
captured terrain, and the population.  This is further pronounced in hostile space which is 
influenced by the opposition, the very type an insurgency seeks to expand with the goal 
of captured terrain serving as new points of attack and alienation between the population 
and the counterinsurgents.  To illustrate, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine writes: 
…maintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources, 
whether host nation, U.S., or multinational. In contrast, a small number of highly 
motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good operations security, and even 
limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. Thus, successful COIN 
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 Stuart Schram and Mao Tse-Tung, Basic Tactics (New York:  Praeger, 1961) 134. 
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operations often require a high ratio of security forces to the protected 
population.6 
 
To further illustrate the value of human terrain, in modern counterinsurgency 
doctrine the ―human terrain‖ becomes the focus in an attempt to willingly ―capture,‖ or at 
the very least to influence the population into joining their side of the conflict.   
Ordinarily, both sides compete for the human terrain, be it through nonviolent persuasion 
or forcible coercion.  Once a side captures or influences the population, the opposing side 
becomes significantly weakened and their legitimacy undermined.  This reduced 
capability is due to the reduced capability to easily conduct offensive or defensive 
operations –that is, kinetic operations to kill and capture adversaries, now protected by 
the local population. Further examples of reduced capability through the loss of popular 
support may often include diminished intelligence from the population on the adversary‘s 
operations, an inability to travel without fear of attack, difficulty maintaining supply 
lines, and general population hostility affecting overall operations in unforeseen ways. 
U.S. Army doctrine discusses the importance of such ―human terrain‖ support for both 
insurgents and counterinsurgents, stating: 
…insurgents rely on friendly elements within the population to provide supplies 
and intelligence…Insurgent camps are also chosen with a view toward easy 
access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, prepared 
escape routes, and good observation of counterinsurgency force approach 
routes…Like COIN [counterinsurgency] in urban areas, rural counterinsurgency 
operations must focus on both locating and killing the guerrilla and on severing 
the supportive element of the  population, such as the mass base and auxiliary, 
from providing supplies and intelligence.7 
 
These many small but significant shifts in approaches to conflict add up to 
significant theoretical, doctrinal, and operational changes.  With common conventional 
                                                 
6
 Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-2. 
7
 Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2, 3-12. 
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concepts of war replaced by new structures and goals of irregular war, the rules of war 
changed holistically.  The more common understanding of Clausewitzian theory of war 
involving overwhelming force application, attrition of the opposition, and superior fire 
and maneuver do not reign supreme in irregular warfare.  Yet, a distinctly different yet 
equally important argument by Clausewitz became prominent in irregular war, which 
asserts that ―War is a continuation of ‗policy‘—or of ‗politics‘—by other means.‖8  This 
concept, while originally written as part of his study on conventional war, takes on new 
undertones in irregular conflict.  In irregular conflict, politics is the foundation of the 
conflict; not only does irregular conflict perpetuate politics in a more violent 
framework—in irregular war often politics is the origin of the conflict—but also political 
change serves  as the end-game.  It is politics that are the conflict-driving grievances, that 
cause populations to support (or become) militants, that give rise to new insurgent 
leaders, and that provide the rallying cry of the insurgent and counterinsurgent.  In 
irregular war, politics are of paramount importance.   
 
Why Insurgency? 
As in most forms of conflict, comparative advantages matter.  The side with the 
most strategic and tactical advantages is usually the victor.  Such advantages might 
include, but not be limited to, the greatest firepower, the stealthiest planes, the largest 
armies, the strongest armor, the most disciplined and trained units, and so on.  But 
paradoxically irregular warfare‘s focus is distinctly different from that of conventional 
warfare.  The normal advantages in conventional war can be turned on their head.  While 
                                                 
8
 Christopher Bassford, ―Clausewitz and His Works,‖ in The Clausewitz Homepage, www.clausewitz.com 
(last accessed March 15, 2011). 
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advanced technology, large and powerful armies, and overwhelming concentrated 
firepower matter even in irregular warfare, they are not the primary focus.  The insurgent 
quickly learns that their forces have little chance of achieving success against a more 
powerful and established counterinsurgency force.  In fact, insurgencies are often forced 
into guerrilla warfare due to their distinct conventional disadvantages (e.g., lack of 
conventional military power) that would normally prove fatal when matched in 
conventional battle.  When this is the case, insurgents often turn to irregular conflict for 
the specific reason of leveraging their irregular advantages against their stronger 
adversary.  The way in which this irregular war is conducted is what turns conventional 
notions of strength on its head. 
In guerrilla warfare, a subset of irregular conflict, guerrilla fighting is often 
pursued as a means for the insurgency to fight covertly as well as to arm themselves with 
weaponry and supplies. A few common guerrilla tactics include ambushes, 
assassinations, propaganda, and other methods of tactical and larger strategic utilization 
of key terrain and population support.  The concept behind this form of warfare is that it 
utilizes conventional strengths as weaknesses.  To illustrate, if a large army knows little 
about the area and population which it occupies, it is easy for local insurgents to turn the 
population against the ―occupiers,‖ painting them as exploiting the country and the 
people.  Such an approach is the norm for insurgent clandestine propaganda.  To further 
these gains, the insurgent may attack from population centers, hoping for an overreaction 
by the counterinsurgent force leading to civilian casualties.  In turn, this further alienates 
the counterinsurgents from the population and often lends additional support to the 
insurgents.  The overall insurgent methodology seeks to use the adversary‘s strength and 
12 
 
overwhelming force to benefit the insurgents.  These small ―victories‖ (i.e., 
counterinsurgency mistakes) amount to strategic success through slow attrition and 
growing popular support for the insurgents.  Once a critical mass of the population turns 
against the counterinsurgents, it becomes enormously costly in all forms of resources to 
maintain operations.  As one author highlights, ―Conceptually, it was similar to the 
technique of a judo wrestler who throws his opponent using not his own strength but the 
gross weight and power of his adversary.‖9  It is also noteworthy that these rules of 
irregular conflict apply to both sides. The counterinsurgents are seeking many of the 
same strategic goals the insurgents are seeking, and thus similar methods are used, albeit 
usually with the use of far greater resources. 
As noted, the focus in irregular conflict is the population, political ideology, local 
grievances, and the exploitation of social and military weaknesses in the adversary.  But 
to win in any conflict there must be a military victory to accompany political victory.  
But this is no small task if an insurgency begins from little in terms of leadership, 
fighters, infrastructure, and logistics. Such victory requires phases of growth, moving 
from small units of untrained and ill-equipped fighters, to battle-tested and field-hardened 
guerrillas and militants with a strong sense of commitment to the cause (i.e., the political 
reason for the insurgency). Thus, an insurgent victory requires skilled fighters, nuanced 
knowledge of irregular tactics and strategy, and a strong determination for the overall 
cause.  In other words, this is a deeply complex form of war in the establishment phase, 
not just for purposes of strategic politics, but also at the tactical level of the individual 
fighters, small unit leaders, and grass-roots population support.   
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 John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) 23. 
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To illustrate these complexities, let us examine a common scenario in irregular 
warfare. Over the past century most developed nations have been overwhelmingly 
focused on technology-driven conventional war.  While perhaps understandable given 
common strategic design and interests, such technology assets in small wars can quickly 
shift into a disadvantage.  This occurs for a number of reasons, including but not limited 
to, ease of technology can ―soften‖ conventional soldiers making them less accustomed 
to rigorous field craft (e.g., mountain warfare).  Such an overreliance on technology also 
backfires when it fails, and technology is often highly specialized and not flexible enough 
to be of value in irregular conflicts environments, thus often leading to undesirable 
results.  Conversely, a guerrilla in rural environments spends days and nights in austere 
environments, including soggy fields or in frozen mountain caves, honing small unit 
guerrilla tactics and living off the land and with the support of local civilians.  But most 
importantly, by living amongst the people, the insurgent cultivates supportive 
relationships with local villagers and tribesmen, providing the insurgent with important 
information the counterinsurgent usually does not have access to.  The insurgent quickly 
realizes that it is their superior knowledge of both the physical terrain and the human 
terrain (the local people) that shifts the advantage toward them, while the technology 
heavy and more conventionally powerful counterinsurgents quickly become bogged 
down, reactionary, and confounded in the absence of understanding of the local 
environment.   
In urban environments, the insurgent also has the additional advantage of 
blending into the masses.  In urban environments, the insurgent looks like the average 
city dwelling citizen, providing them with the ability to hide and plan in plain sight.  This 
14 
 
effect is even more pronounced when dealing with a foreign counterinsurgency force.  
Urban insurgencies also present unique opportunities for the insurgent, particularly when 
attempting a coercive approach to insurgency through the use of urban-based terrorism in 
order to delegitimize the counterinsurgency force and the government in which the 
insurgents seek to overthrow (e.g., the French in Algeria).  Thus, the advantage in 
irregular wars, whether urban or rural-based, does not favor the more powerful side; 
rather the advantage most often favors the side prepared and equipped to understand, 
leverage, and overcome the nuanced challenges and paradoxes of irregular war.   
These paradoxical dynamics also lend themselves in shaping how irregular 
conflict is conducted.  Irregular war is just that: Irregular and even arcane, because it is a 
unique form of conflict, irregular war can fool the professional soldier into approaching 
the conflict as they might a conventional war, by using overwhelming firepower, 
advanced technology, and strong offensive action.  Yet, it is only natural to perform what 
one knows best, and thus if the counterinsurgent understands best how to employ 
conventional methods, it is highly likely that the counterinsurgent will use these 
conventional methods.  Experienced insurgents are often fully aware of such tendencies 
which are illustrated throughout contemporary and modern history.10  Thus insurgent 
leaders often play to such approaches, luring the stronger foe to make mistakes with their 
superior strength, tempting them into clumsily wielding force when striking at insurgents.  
A common example includes shooting from population centers in hopes of provoking 
strikes that result in innocent victims.  Another example is distribution of propaganda, 
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 A few examples include the French in Algeria, The British in India, and the U.S. in Vietnam, all which 
demonstrate the ineffectual approach of using overwhelming force to destroy an insurgency.  The results of 
these insurgencies demonstrated that although they did cause considerable, even enormous, losses to the 
insurgents, the long-term outcome required a political settlement rather than purely a military solution. 
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aimed at winning support in population centers and casting blame for misdeeds on 
―occupiers.‖  Such tactics, of which there are many, are common, effective, and of little 
or no cost to the insurgent.     
Likewise, the counterinsurgents attempt to lure the insurgents to make 
miscalculations and alienate them against the population.  Common approaches include 
information operations (propaganda) and campaigns targeting the local population (e.g., 
illustrating how the insurgents are ―terrorists‖ and ―murderers‖).  The primary point is 
that successful irregular wars are fought primarily with population support in mind, and 
not strictly through the barrel of a gun.  In fact, the use of extreme violence often 
undermines the overall effort, ending with both blaming unnecessary violence on the 
other, both sides alienating themselves against the population, and often creating a 
stalemate.  Regardless, the side that invariably wins in the long-run is the side with 
population support—and is able to maintain that support over the duration of the conflict.  
Such an assertion is what American interagency irregular war policy is based upon. The 
U.S Government Counterinsurgency Guide illustrates this concept:  
American counterinsurgency practice rests on a number of assumptions: that the 
decisive effort is rarely military (although security is the essential prerequisite for 
success); that our efforts must be directed to the creation of local and national 
governmental structures that will serve their populations, and, over time, replace 
the efforts of foreign partners; that superior knowledge, and in particular, 
understanding of the ‗human terrain‘ is essential; and that we must have the 
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 U.S. Government, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Pol-Mil 
Affairs, 2009), Preface. 
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The Importance of Learning and Adaptation 
Irregular warfare is also a competition of who learns and adapts the most rapidly.  
This dynamic is perhaps even more important than conventional tactical and strategic 
prowess or even the forms of weaponry used.  The weapon of most value in an 
insurgency is the human mind and the ability to think quickly and shift tactics quickly 
and seamlessly.  Irregular warfare highlights the ―learning‖ aspects of war in order to 
rapidly adjust to the adversary‘s actions, just as conventional war highlights tactical 
prowess and the effective use of technology.  While the military academies are the school 
houses of professional armies, the battlefield is the school house of the insurgent.  
Insurgency is most effective when it is a field-driven learning environment.  While few 
theories can teach how to effectively defeat more powerful enemies, the true value of 
insurgent strategy is that it mitigates advanced technology from a position of weakness 
and places a heavy focus on the role and support by the relatively ―powerless‖ 
population.  To do this, the insurgent must have basic knowledge of the adversaries‘ 
technological capabilities while simultaneously reducing warfare down to its most 
rudimentary elements, such as flexibility, mobility, and superior intelligence.  In other 
words, the insurgent must know what technology can and cannot do and then exploit it at 
the point of weakness.  To illustrate, despite extraordinary surveillance capabilities from 
satellites and spy drones, these technologies cannot discern the difference between an 
insurgent and a common villager in similar dress, speaking the same language.  Rather, it 
is usually only the local villager who can distinguish between the two as only they know 
the names and faces of everyone residing in the village, and are able to discern between 
slight differences of dialect.  Thus, the capabilities needed are rarely simply technological 
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(although they can assist when employed intelligently); rather obtaining population 
support, and derive critical information as a result, is critical.   
But just as insurgents learn and adapt to their enemies, counterinsurgents also 
seek to rapidly learn and adapt to the insurgents‘ tactics and strategies.  To the learning 
insurgent and counterinsurgent, being "defeated" in an operation is an opportunity to 
learn and redevelop tactics.  The side that learns the quickest and rapidly applies ―lessons 
learned‖ in the field will have the advantage.  In a war based on who learns and adjusts 
the most rapidly, an important distinction to be made is the type of lessons learned and 
applied.  For both insurgents and counterinsurgents, a tactical lesson from the battlefield 
is of less significance than strategic lessons that guide the overall strategic effort such as 
how to communicate better with the local population.  Certainly, conflict field tradecraft 
(e.g. firing a weapon effectively) is important but such tactics are a function of practice 
and repetition.  In contrast, learning to win over a population is a mixture of complex 
politics, psychology, sociology, and conflict tradecraft.  As the U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guidance document highlights: 
[Insurgency] is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force 
to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be 
effective. Insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a 
centralized, military-style command structure, but may involve a complex matrix 
of different actors with various aims, loosely connected in dynamic and non-
hierarchical networks. To be successful, insurgencies require charismatic 
leadership, supporters, recruits, supplies, safe havens and funding (often from 
illicit activities). They only need the active support of a few enabling individuals, 
but the passive acquiescence of a large proportion of the contested population will 
give a higher  probability of success. This is best achieved when the political 
cause of the insurgency has strong appeal, manipulating religious, tribal or local 
identity to exploit common societal grievances or needs. Insurgents seek to gain 
control of populations through a combination of persuasion, subversion and 
coercion while using  guerrilla tactics to offset the strengths of government 
security forces. Their intent is usually to protract the struggle, exhaust the 
government and win sufficient popular support to force capitulation or political 
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accommodation. Consequently, insurgencies evolve through a series of stages, 
though the progression and outcome will be different in almost every case.12  
 
In conclusion, irregular warfare, including both insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, is a unique form of conflict.  Irregular war does not ascribe to 
traditional or conventional rules for a variety of reasons.  First, irregular conflict is 
primarily political on all levels—from the high-level strategy to the grass-roots tactics of 
the individual fighter.  Secondly, irregular warfare‘s focus is on very different types of 
―terrain.‖  While conventional war places great emphasis on capturing physical terrain, it 
is the human terrain that matters most in irregular war.  In wars among populations, it 
matters not if the geographic terrain captured amounts to unsustainable losses in 
resources over time as well as extending forces beyond capability opening it up to 
constant insurgent harassment.  Third, conventional strength means little in irregular war.  
The skills required for victory in irregular war are often distinct from the skills required 
to win in conventional conflict.  In irregular war, greater focus is placed upon winning 
the ―hearts and minds‖ of the population rather than on individual tactics.  The 
philosophy in irregular war is premised on the notion that whoever achieves the 
population‘s support—lending the advantages of time, space, and will—achieves 
overwhelming advantages.  Such a philosophy is reflected in the Afghan proverb, ―You 
[the invaders] have the watches, but we [the opposition] have the time.‖13     
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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN IRREGULAR WAR 
That these are our grievances which we have thus laid before his majesty, 
with that freedom of language and sentiment which becomes a free people 
claiming their rights as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift 
of their chief magistrate. –Thomas Jefferson, 1774 
 
In viewing insurgency and counterinsurgency through the lens of success and the 
ability to apply lessons learned, America‘s results are historically mixed.  In earlier 
periods, America achieved extraordinary success fighting as insurgents (―patriots‖) 
during the American Revolution, but fared less successfully in the modern age of 
counterinsurgency, particularly in contemporary times, such as in Vietnam, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan.  Yet, despite the controversial nature of irregular warfare America 
performed successfully in the Indian Wars and the Philippines, countering strong albeit 
flawed insurgent movements. Other counterinsurgency efforts remain difficult to 
determine regarding America‘s level of success, including current efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  This chapter comprehensively discusses America‘s experience in irregular 
conflict, both insurgency and counterinsurgency, highlighting those conflicts with long-
term American involvement.  Finally, this chapter seeks to analyze what went right 
and/or wrong and distill what lessons can be drawn from successes and failures. 





1775-1883:  An American Insurgency 
America is the product of a revolutionary birth, born of insurgency.  It is well 
documented that American colonists fought a prolonged bloody war against British 
counterinsurgents seeking to maintain America in the British Empire.  Many scholars of 
the Revolutionary War agree that the British forces were superior in terms of military 
professionalism, technology, proficiency, and even discipline regarding conventional 
tactics and strategy.  To overcome these deficits, the American militants utilized an array 
of irregular tactics to make up for what would have been failure in conventional success.  
To illustrate, scholars argue that some of the most impactful military victories carried out 
by George Washington‘s fighters often utilized guerrilla style military tactics, such as the 
Battle of Trenton, a post-Christmas raid that led to an overwhelming victory against the 
Hessian mercenaries, an ambush in inclement weather as the Hessians recovered from the 
previous evening‘s festivities. Individual battles aside, within the larger strategic aspect 
of the American Revolutionary War, American insurgents used a wide array of 
contemporary insurgent tactics, utilizing such methods as hit and run ambush attacks, 
covert smuggling of weaponry and resources, assassination, psychological operations, 
and collecting intelligence from citizens, to name but a few.  In fact, the American 
campaign against the Hessian units serves to epitomize modern irregular warfare, such as 
the attempt to propagandize the Hessians into joining the American ranks with the 
enticement of free land and citizenship.14  This was in stark contrast to the traditional 
style of British warfare which was characterized as large unit tactics accustomed to major 
battles in open spaces.  In British custom, guerrilla warfare was an abomination and not 
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worthy of gentlemanly conduct in war.  However, after a few disastrous outings against 
the British, the American militants quickly came to terms with the realization that they 
could not be victorious in the early stages of the revolution if they fought according to 
British rules of warfare.  However, as we will see later, much like Mao‘s notion of 
moving toward conventional force in the late stages of insurgency (i.e., the ―strategic 
offensive‖ stage), the Americans eventually defeated the British on conventional terms 
and with conventional armies.  Yet, to survive the early stages of the insurgency, the 
Americans‘ success came largely as a result of guerrilla style fighting amongst a 
sympathetic population. 
In the early stages of the insurrection, guerrilla warfare was a primary tool in the 
tactics that were employed by the American insurgents.  However, the overall strategy 
was one of strategic patience and constant harassment in a territory that sympathized with 
patriots.  The long-term effect of this strategy was the slow attrition of the British as 
guerrilla fighters, often common citizens, attacked seemingly randomly, only to dissolve 
back into the population centers or the countryside, leaving the British with the weary 
realization that they were unable to respond effectively.  Therefore, the strategy was two-
fold.  First, the strategy sought the destruction of military morale by sowing frustration, 
confusion, and helplessness.  Secondly, the strategy attempted to utilize civilian popular 
support in order to attrite the British in men and materiel.   
Although a heavy-handed British strategy targeting civilians was never 
implemented throughout the American colony, the involvement of the population was 
inevitable.  The presence of large numbers of ―Loyalists,‖ those loyal to the King and 
British Empire, presented challenges for the British in attempting not to isolate the 
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Loyalists and push them toward support of the insurgents.  Due to the interest in retaining 
Loyalist sympathizers, the British chose not to make a concerted effort to harshly 
suppress the overall civilian population.  However, when the British overreached in their 
attempt to keep civilian population hubs under control, due in large part to a vast array of 
grievances including taxation, it inevitably led to anger and resentment against British 
occupation. In short, the Americans wanted their liberty and nothing assuaged that 
growing momentum.   
As the situation continued to develop over time, the British attempts at enforcing 
laws, targeting militants and propagandists, and billeting within cities further diminished 
support for the British presence.  The ever-growing colonialist grievances played into the 
hands of revolutionary leaders.  Such grievances provided easy themes for propaganda 
which individuals such as Thomas Paine frequently seized upon. In response, as the 
revolutionary support base grew, due in large part to growing grievances and 
revolutionary sympathy, counterproductive British practices pushed Loyalist to support 
revolutionary causes.  One such issue that caused contention was that the use of the 
Hessian mercenaries, sent to put down the insurrection, rather than the King using British 
soldiers exclusively, was seen as an insult.15  Furthermore, the more protracted the war 
became, and the more frequently the British targeted population centers to purge 
insurgents and their sympathizers, the more their efforts appeared to fail in the eyes of the 
American population.  Thus, as the conflict escalated without an apparent British victory 
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at hand, the more inclined the population became to support the local American 
insurgents.   
The long-term successful American strategy, whether by design, accident, or a 
combination, effectively separated British forces from popular support.  The American 
revolutionary strategy was based first and foremost on swaying popular support toward 
the revolutionary cause and then defeating the British forces on the battlefield through 
protracted warfare.  To illustrate the value of propaganda on this front, revolutionary 
propaganda issued throughout the colony is well documented and the propaganda 
pamphlets written at the time still sell well today.  A few of these propagandists are now 
known as American ―founding fathers,‖ reflecting the level of influence they had during 
the war. These two efforts—issuing propaganda to sway the population and the strategy 
of protracted warfare—were conducted in tandem as General Washington well 
understood that effective propaganda and defeating the British on the battlefield by 
whatever means necessary roused further popular support for his insurgent army.  
Additionally, the prolonging of the war resulted in wearing down the British forces in 
both lives and treasure, while seeking to deteriorate the lines of public support from the 
British homeland for the continuation of the war.  The strategy‘s success was observable 
as by 1780, immediately following General Cornwallis‘s surrender to George 
Washington, the British government fell to the opposition group, the Peace Party, due 
largely to lack of political will for the war‘s continuation.16  This political turn of events 
effectively ended the war in 1781, though it was not formally concluded until 1783 with 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris.  Following Cornwallis‘s surrender and the subsequent 
                                                 
16
 Piers Mackesy, The War for America: 1775–1783 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993) 435. 
24 
 
change of the British government, no major battles ensued and the British forces 
remained largely garrisoned until the official end of the war. 
Several lessons can be garnered from the American Revolution for both 
insurgency and counterinsurgency.  Looking first at counterinsurgency lessons, the 
British learned that finding the right balance between coercion and leniency is 
extraordinarily difficult.  While the British military tried hard not to terrorize the 
American population with excessive force, the politicians in London failed to understand 
that taxation and political dominance did not play well in the American colony and 
allowed colonial propagandists easy opportunities to develop sympathy through 
pamphleteering in the public.  Secondly, the British likely learned that perceptions of the 
local population are critical.  When the British made the decision to bring in outside 
mercenaries to fight Britain‘s fight, this further alienated the British from the American 
population.  Also, while the Boston massacre might not have been a massacre by most 
standards, the Boston Gazette made it appear as premeditated murder by British 
soldiers.17  Such propaganda is critical in building sympathy for and against an 
insurgency.  In the case of the American Revolution, the British stood by idly as 
propaganda spread from city to city and into the countryside.  This challenge of 
understanding the population was worsened by the fact that while Britain maintained 
strength in the cities, they had little presence and authority in the countryside.18   
In looking at the American insurgency, several lessons can also be distilled.  First, 
the American strategy of protraction worked well, eroding British military morale while 
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having a similar effect in the British homeland.  Secondly, the American strategy of 
shifting from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare at the right phase of the 
insurgency also worked well, allowing the American army to perform the necessary coup 
de grace with conventional armies and providing the Americans with international 
legitimacy following victory.  Finally, perhaps the most important lesson of the American 
Revolution is the value of highly effective propaganda, by word-of-mouth or traditional 
media to both exaggerate and build upon grievances, raise public awareness, and 
communicate with sympathizers.  In short, the American Revolution carries nearly all the 
hallmarks of modern insurgency and provided one of the earliest examples of 
contemporary irregular warfare.      
 
The ―Hard War‖ Years: The American Civil War 
The American experience in irregular conflict certainly did not end following the 
attainment of American sovereignty.  Several wars were waged by the Americans 
throughout the nineteenth century, including the War of 1812 (1812-1815); the American 
Civil War (1861-1865); the Constabulary Years, including Pacification and the Indian 
Wars (1865-1898); and the Cuban and Philippines campaigns (1898-1902). With some 
minor exceptions, roughly the first sixty years of the nineteenth century composed of 
conventionally fought conflicts.    
Other than the ongoing Indian Wars, the first major irregular operation against the 
U.S. Army was during the American Civil War. The Civil War saw a limited degree of 
concerted population focused activity as the majority of the fighting was focused on 
conventional warfare, defining the war by large well-known battles that resonate even 
today, such as the Battle of Gettysburg, the Battle of Bull Run, the Battle of 
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Fredericksburg, and many others.  However, the story of major land and sea battles 
during the Civil War misses the larger picture.  During the Civil War some of the most 
studied guerrilla fighters emerged, not least of whom was John Mosby, nicknamed the 
―Grey Ghost,‖ who led the Confederate unit Mosby‘s Rangers.  What occurred between 
Mosby‘s Rangers and the Union falls within the definition of guerrilla warfare, pitting 
Confederate guerrillas against Union counter-guerrillas. Due to the Confederate's military 
effort to secede from an internationally recognized nation-state, Mosby‘s Rangers should 
be defined as part of a larger Confederate insurgency, albeit in the style of guerrilla 
warfare often associated with modern insurgency.  As we will examine, Mosby was 
indeed successful enough that it changed the way America fought in irregular conflict, 
bringing to the fore a harsher approach to counterinsurgency which played out later in the 
Indian Wars and the Philippines.  
In relation to the scale of conventional forces in the Civil War, the use of 
guerrillas was miniscule.  Further, the peripheral attention that guerrilla tactics received 
from scholars makes it difficult to conclude exactly how successful the guerrilla approach 
was to the end result of the Civil War.  There is even little agreement amongst Civil War 
scholars as to whether or not Confederate guerrillas were an intended part of the primary 
Confederate strategy.  For example, a highly regarded Confederate General disparaged 
Mosby‘s tactics and even requested General Robert E. Lee to disband Mosby‘s Rangers.19  
Some of these negative perceptions were likely the result of a lack of consistency among 
the guerrillas.  While there were professional soldiers serving as guerrillas, such as 
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Mosby‘s Rangers, others were little more than criminals in the business of savagery.  As 
one author writes of the Confederate guerrillas: 
The complexity surrounding the term guerrilla makes it difficult to establish exact 
definitions of every Southerner who conducted irregular warfare against the 
Union  Army…Those who conducted guerrilla warfare against the invading 
Union Army fit many different definitions. There were Confederate cavalrymen, 
such as Nathan Bedford Forest and John Hunt Morgan, who practiced evasive hit-
and-run-style tactics as part of organized and sanctioned Confederate raid 
operations.  So-called partisan rangers, who  often wore Confederate uniforms but 
enjoyed complete autonomy from the conventional force, preyed on Federal 
railroads, telegraph lines, and supply wagons. There were bushwhackers who, in 
the guise of innocent civilians, waylaid Union pickets for the mere purpose of 
robbery or murder. Perhaps the most difficult class of guerrilla to define, although 
quite prevalent, was that which attacked simply for the sake of resisting the Union 
invaders.20 
 
Several prominent Union generals concluded that when dealing with successful 
Confederate guerrillas, the larger reality was that they were facing a hostile population 
rather than merely hostile fighters.  The Union soon realized that the Confederate 
militants were being protected by the population.  As the war continued, the Confederate 
guerrillas took their toll on the Union, placing enormous pressure on their logistical lines 
and causing substantial losses to the Union ranks.  In response, and out of growing 
desperation to defeat the demoralizing and formidable Confederate guerrillas, the Union 
formulated the policy of ―hard war,‖ targeting strategic population centers in order to 
punish and instill fear within the population supporting the Confederate guerrillas.  Thus, 
the Union sought to use fear as the ultimate disincentive to stop popular support for 
guerrilla fighters.21  This strategy sought to divide the population from the insurgents and 
thus remove the life-lines which sustained them both logistically and morally.  Andrew 
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Birtle, a military historian, summarizes the counter-guerrilla strategy employed by the 
Union: 
The extent to which the policy of destruction was successful in rooting out the 
guerrillas varied depending upon the circumstances.  Nevertheless, commanders 
had enough success that by 1865 devastation rather than moderation had become 
the guiding principle of federal armies in suppressing the insurrection.  This did 
not mean that the Army had abandoned moderation entirely.  Many officers felt 
uncomfortable about denying quarter and burning farms and crops, and even those 
who endorsed the harshest measures endeavored to prevent their soldiers from 
degenerating into the kind of lawlessness that they so despised in the guerrillas.  
Indeed, many of the same officers who declared a ―war of extermination‖ against 
the guerrillas offered generous terms of amnesty to those who voluntarily laid 
down their arms.  Nor did the Army action indiscriminately, for while excesses 
did occur, for the most part federal actions represented what one historian has 
described as a ―directed severity‖ that was aimed at specific targets (most notably 
upper-class secessionists, guerrillas, and military resources) than at Southern 
society as a whole.22   
While the Confederate effort with guerrilla warfare did not succeed in winning the 
war, it was not a result of the failure of the guerrilla approach itself, but rather the larger 
strategy employed by the South.  Looking specifically at the guerrilla aspects employed 
by the Confederacy, it had enough effect to force new approaches by the Union military.  
Therefore, what came as a result of the Confederate guerrilla tactics was the development 
of a new approach to how America viewed effective counterinsurgency (and thus a major 
subset of counterinsurgency being counter-guerrilla operations).  Sherman‘s ―March to 
the Sea,‖ leaving in its wake massive infrastructure devastation, decimated private 
property, and ultimately weakened Confederate resolve, was among the first of many 
campaigns illustrating America‘s emerging ―hard war‖ military philosophy.     
The military strategic decision to target population centers perceived as 
supporting insurgents is a significant landmark in American counterinsurgency doctrine.  
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For the Union, what started as an attempt to destroy bushwhackers, bandits and common 
criminals quickly escalated into a full-fledged effort to remove popular support for an 
army of insurgents set upon picking apart Union armies through irregular warfare.  As the 
confederate insurgents demonstrated their capability to wreak havoc upon the Union, the 
Union decided the only way to stop them was to target the sources of their support—the 
sympathetic population.  Leading the effort in this shift in Union policy was General 
Tecumseh Sherman, seen by some scholars as the architect of this campaign of violence 
and destruction against the Confederate population centers, referred to as the ―hard war‖ 
approach.  Because of the violence targeting civilians, including the burning of crops, 
property and homes, scholars often refer to this as a form of ―punitive war,‖23 or ―hard 
war,‖ similar in many respects to past military campaigns resulting in large civilian 
casualties in a strategy to break the will of opposition, be it passive or active support from 
the population.  However, this shift had a long-term impact on future American 
counterinsurgency operations, as it was codified in the U.S. Military Academy, the 
training grounds for future military officers, that such tactics were to be taught as best 
practices meriting future replication. As Birtle writes, ―Indeed, the greatest contribution 
of the Civil War to the development of Army doctrine was not in the charting of new 
ideas but in the validation and sanctification of old ones.‖24 
 
The Indian Wars 
A strong lineage of counter-guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare was 
transmitted from centuries of fighting between American colonists (later the American 
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army) and the Native American Indians.  Open warfare between Native Americans and 
the American colonists began in 1634 with the Pequot War in present-day Southern New 
England.  Conflicts of varying size and intensity occurred until approximately 1918 with 
the surrender of a band of Yaquis Indians in the State of Arizona.  Within those centuries 
the American Indian Wars resulted in enormous loss of life and treasure for all sides.  In 
the end, the Native Americans emerged devastated as a people, with almost everything 
about their way of life, culture, and sense of history altered.  The following is an 
overview of what occurred throughout these irregular conflicts and what lessons can be 
taken from the long and costly civilizational war.   
The last Indian threat of expulsion of the settlers occurred in 1763-1766 with 
Pontiac‘s Rebellion.  After Pontiac‘s near victory, Native American offensive efforts 
gave way to defensive efforts as colonialist militias and armies focused on Native 
American population centers, pushing ever further into Indian Territory.  The only period 
of relative calm between settlers and Western powers occurred during various outbreaks 
of war between Western nations, such as the American Revolution and the Civil War, but 
even these periods witnessed violence between the two sides.  Contributing to further 
hardship of the native tribes was continuous warfare among the Native American tribes.  
Thus, over the course of centuries of conflict the Native populations faced enormous 
strain across much of the American expanse.     
 
Lessons of a Long and Brutal War 
The way the Native Americans fought was very different from the way in which 
traditional European armies fought.  Europeans employed large forces to fight in open 
terrain, while Native Americans employed guerrilla fighting techniques, employing quick 
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strike and retreat tactics and thus seeking the element of surprise.  While European 
military tradition was familiar with irregular warfare, dating to at least the Thirty Years‘ 
War,25 it was never seen as a preferable way in which to fight and was usually only 
undertaken when main-force units had been destroyed and pushed to desperation, or 
employed as a distraction operation (e.g., to harass and demoralize enemy units with the 
goal of setting up future larger-scale conventional battles).    
To add to the Americans‘ challenges, the Native American guerrilla tactics were 
often conducted masterfully.  What is certain is that the Native Americans were proficient 
guerrilla fighters with extensive experience and capability in such forms of warfare, 
having practiced and perfected the techniques over millennia.  Military scholars also 
often conclude that the average native fighter was a more agile and often more skilled 
fighter than the average American soldier.  However, effective guerrilla tactics did not 
lead to victory for a variety of reasons.  Why the American Indians fared so poorly during 
the Indian Wars had much more to do with social structure than military capability and 
capacity.   
Critical vulnerabilities of the American Indians existed throughout the duration of 
the Indian Wars.  One critical strategic difference between the two was that Native 
American societies never shifted from loose tribal bands toward the pursuit of some 
aspects of modern usages of large defensive alliances.  As one U.S. Naval Academy 
historian summarized, ―they [Native Americans] remained a pre-modern people.‖26  The 
vulnerability of Native American premodernity is that institutional culture and social 
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structures matter, particularly in a conflict in which the population support and 
sustainment is of strategic importance.  To further illustrate, this lack of political and 
military modernity left native populations vulnerable to large and well-supplied national 
armies which were able to attrite the American Indians over time, from large populations 
to a total annihilation of several tribes.  While disease was also a factor outside of 
conflict, the means in which the conflict was fought was dictated by the structure and 
values of both civilizations.  For the Indians, rapid mobility was favored, while the 
Americans favored strong well supplied armies, tactically linking outposts deep into the 
heart of Indian Territory.  Only the Americans had the luxury of shifting tactics and 
strategies after hard lessons were learned fighting the Indians.  In contrast, the American 
Indians were hemmed in by a strong sense of immutable culture, resource cultivation and 
use, and social structure.  While the Native Americans made the war protracted, bloody, 
and deeply frustrating for the Americans, they did not win ultimately due to these strong 
structural and cultural constraints. 
In looking at some of these constraints, the Native Americans placed strong 
emphasis on ―warrior culture‖ and in many aspects were arguably superior warriors.  As 
one author noted, the Seminole War in Florida ―cost the lives of ten soldiers and 
approximately ten thousand dollars for every Seminole either killed or captured.‖27  
Despite these individual-level advantages, the native warriors lacked large scale 
organizational tactics and a political tradition of large and frequent military alliances. In 
contrast, the Americans inherited both traditions from European military tradition and 
doctrine, effectively employing these strategies against the British during the American 
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Revolution, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and all of the major wars that followed.  For 
a short time, and in limited scale, the Native Americans attempted to form limited 
military alliances, but European and American forces were frequently able to turn the 
tribes against one another with relative ease.  One such example was the use of Crow 
scouts against Sioux tribes in the American West.  In this case, the Americans capitalized 
on hard feelings from past conflicts between the two.  What this permitted was the 
weakening of enemy tribes through the use of neighboring tribes far more familiar with 
American Indian tribal and warfare customs than was obtainable from within the U.S. 
Army.28  It is noteworthy that due to its effectiveness, practitioners still use this approach 
today.  
However, the Native Americans held a unique advantage that caused considerable 
consternation amongst the Americans.  This key advantage was that the Native 
Americans understood guerrilla warfare far better than the settlers and soldiers and 
rejected defined Western constraints in their style of warfare, often striking at civilians 
and outposts and quickly dissolving back into the countryside, forests, and swamps.  
While it has been argued that this approach caused the war to become more existential, 
drawing both into ―total war,‖ the very fact the natives conducted effective guerrilla 
warfare illustrated that native tribes understood the strategy of ―shaping‖ population 
sentiment with long-term strategy.  Similar to the American Civil War and the strategy of 
attacking insurgent-sympathizing populations, native tribes hoped to raise the stakes of 
expansion to a level the settlers were not willing to pay.  In this sense, the Native 





Americans were practicing what the U.S. Army termed the ―hard war‖ approach, learned 
in past insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.   
Today, we commonly refer to such tactics against civilians as ―terrorism‖ and 
even ―war crimes.‖ But such tactics were familiar to Western armies, and were often 
employed as a legitimate form of warfare (e.g., WWII‘s frequent bombing of cities just 
twenty years following the last Indian conflict).  Just as in the Civil War, such tactics 
were designed to weaken the resolve of the population, destroy infrastructure, and raise 
the cost of warfare to an unsustainable level. Yet, in the case of the Indian Wars, rather 
than capitulation, such tactics led to far bloodier conflicts and caused elevated levels of 
hatred on both sides.  To illustrate, Captain Randolph Marcy, a frontier U.S. Army 
officer, quoted a soldier which demonstrated the level of hatred toward the Natives. 
―They are the most onsartainest varmints in all creation, and I reckon tha‘r not 
mor‘n half human; for you never seed a human, arter you‘d fed and treated him to 
the best fixins in your lodge, jist turn round and steal all your horses, or ary other 
thing he could lay his hands on. No, not adzackly. He would feel kinder grateful, 
and ask you to spread  a blanket in his lodge ef you ever passed that a-way.  But 
the Injun he don‘t care shucks for you, and is rady to do you a heap of mischief as 
soon as he quits your feed.  No, Cap.,‖ he continued, ―it‘s not the right way to 
give um presents to buy peace; but ef I war governor of these yeer United States, 
I‘ll tell you what I‘d do.  I‘d invite um all to a big feast, and make b‘lieve I 
wanted to have a big talk; and as soon as I got um all together, I‘d pitch in and 
sculp about half of um, and then t‘other half would be mighty glad to make peace 
that would stick.  That‘s the way I‘d make a treaty with the dog‘ond, red-bellied 
varmints; and as sure as you‘re born, Cap., that‘s the only way.‖   
I suggested to him the idea that there would be a lack of good faith and honor in 
such a proceeding, and that it would be much more in accordance with my notions 
of fair dealing to meet openly in the field, and there endeavor to punish them if 
they deserve it. To this he replied, ―taint no use to talk about honor with them, 
Cap.; they hain‘t got no such thing in um; and they won‘t show fair fight, any way 
you can fix it. Don‘t they kill and sculp a white man when-ar they get the better 
on him?  The mean varmints, they‘ll never behave themselves until you give um a 
clean out and out licking. They can‘t onderstand white folks‘ ways, and they 
won‘t learn um; and ef you treat um decently, they think you ar afeard. You may 
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depend on‘t, Cap., the only way to treat Injuns is to thrash them well at first, then 
the balance will sorter take to you and behave themselves.‖29 
 
As war between the U.S. Army, citizen militias, and the native warriors 
continued, American soldiers and militias became more adept at Indian forms of guerrilla 
warfare.  In the historical case of the Indian Wars, prolonged warfare allowed time for 
learning and adjustment by the U.S. as well as the development of understanding of 
American Indian culture and vulnerabilities.  Once these vulnerabilities were understood, 
they were exploited by the development of new forms of counter-guerrilla tactics by the 
Americans.  Many of these new tactics targeted the American Indian population centers 
in an attempt to ―draw out‖ the Indian fighter who was more accustomed to ambush and 
rapid withdrawal tactics.  A typical approach by the U.S. was to destroy Indian food 
infrastructure and crops, thereby reducing the capability of even the most ardent Native 
American resistance.  As one scholar writes, 
The end of the war [the Seminole War] came under the strategy devised by Col. 
William J. Worth.  He refused to continue the six-year-long wild goose chase 
after an enemy that could seldom be found and, even when found, rarely gave 
battle.  Worthy went directly  for the jugular of every guerrilla‘s strategy; his 
support.  Using summer campaigns for the first time (the summer had always 
been considered too hot), Worth led his men directly against the settlements and 
crops of the Seminoles, destroying their means of subsistence and preventing 
them from raising and harvesting further crops. His troops suffered greatly from 
sickness, but their method worked.  Without subsistence, even the fierce 
resistance of the Indians could not be maintained.30 
 
As will be illustrated, the Indian Wars escalated from the destruction of food 
infrastructure to attacks at the very heart of Indian life, the population centers.  
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While never formally documented, many lessons from the early years of the 
Indian Wars were transmitted to and from the Union in putting down the Confederate 
guerrillas.  Just as confederate guerrillas lived among and sought support from local 
populations, so too did the Indian fighters live and receive support from their villages.  
An early lesson from the Indian Wars was that the population was the source of strength 
for the Indian warriors, and thus had to be dealt with in order to remove civilian support 
from the calculation of the conflict.  After years of mutual attacks on civilians, ―total 
war‖ was brought to bear, both sides showing little interest in limiting the war to the 
fighters. Through total war strategy, the Americans sought to raise the cost of war to a 
level too high for the Native Americans to absorb, and thus encouraged their relocation to 
―reservations.‖  An illustration of these ―total war‖ strategies are well summarized by a 
U.S. Army participant in the Bad Axe Massacres in 1832, an incident which left 
numerous Native women and children dead and injured as soldiers tried to capture Native 
population centers: 
During the engagement we killed some of the squaws through mistake. It was a 
great misfortune to those miserable squaws and children, that they did not carry 
into execution [the plan] they had formed on the morning of the battle -- that was, 
to come and meet us, and surrender themselves prisoners of war. It was a horrid 
sight to witness little children, wounded and suffering the most excruciating pain, 
although they were of the savage enemy, and the common enemy of the country.31  
Despite the controversial nature of such tactics, many lessons were learned and 
transferred for future engagements as a result of this new style of warfare on the frontier 
of American expansion.  During the Civil War, the Union tapped into these earlier 
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experiences of ―total war,‖ similarly punishing secessionist populations with ―hard war‖ 
tactics, resulting in the utter destruction of the Southern economy.  However, just as the 
lessons from the early Indian Wars were utilized during the Civil War, likewise the Civil 
War experience also transferred and reinforced its own lessons against Indian tribes 
during the later westward expansion, which resumed in full-force following the Civil 
War.  While the post-Antebellum U.S. Army never formally codified these ―lessons 
learned‖ from the early Indian Wars, many lessons were retained due to the fact that 
several prominent Civil War leaders, known for developing the ―hard war‖ strategy 
against the Confederate population, saw action once again in the frontier Indian Wars.32  
To illustrate this transfer of experience and knowledge from the Civil War to the 
application in Indian Wars, Andrew Birtle writes: 
Mahan‘s [Dennis Hart Mahan first introduced Indian warfare into West Point‘s 
curriculum in 1835] approach to Indian warfare was reinforced in the minds of 
officers by the Army‘s experience in the Civil War.  Many soldiers emerged from 
the rebellion convinced that the best way to win a ―peoples‖ war was to strike at 
the foundation of resistance—the enemy population. Now, with the rebellion 
crushed, the officers were prepared to apply the same strategy of destruction to 
undermine the American Indians physical and moral ability to resist.33 
While many military officers were pleased with transferring from the 
Reconstruction Era South following the Civil War, hoping to depart the politics of 
governing, the frontier would prove to be no less political, far lengthier, and yet more 
controversial.  Birtle summarizes the breadth of the challenge standing before the U.S. 
Army in the frontier, writing: 
By the mid-century the Native American population west of the Mississippi 
numbered about 270,000 people divided into over 125 distinct tribal, linguistic, 
and cultural groups.   Although the Army tried to shield the Indians from illegal 
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white encroachment, its primary mission was to pursue Indian raiders, punish 
recalcitrant tribes, and confine the indigenous population to an ever-dwindling 
area ―reserved‖ for their use. Conflict was an inevitable result of this process.  
From the signing of a flurry of abortive peace treaties in October 1865 until the 
suppression of the last Indian uprising at Leech Lake, Minnesota, in October 
1898, the Army engaged in over a thousand combats as part of its forcible 
pacification of the Western Indians.34    
   
Betwixt and Between: The Civil War, the Indian Wars, and Modernity 
Despite the large number of counter-guerrilla and counterinsurgency wars in 
which the American armies were engaged throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the era of small wars was not yet truly upon America.  While no war rivaled 
the collective length of the Indian Wars, and casualties were never as great as in 
America‘s conventional wars, ―small wars,‖ an earlier term for irregular wars, were 
prolific throughout the early twentieth century and continue to this day.  The first of these 
small wars in the twentieth century was the Philippines, which remarkably has yet to be 
fully resolved now over a hundred years after America‘s first intervention into the 
country.  Nevertheless, the Philippines campaign remains among the most important 
early counterinsurgency campaigns in American military history.  The Philippines 
campaign of 1899-1902 was both similar and different from past counter-guerrilla and 
counterinsurgency operations in America‘s history.  Similarities include the policy of 
―chastisement,‖ while a difference includes the policy ―attraction.‖   
Until Mao Tse-tung arrived on the global scene in the mid-twentieth century, 
giving rise to future American counterinsurgency campaigns (e.g., Vietnam), the 
Philippines insurgency represents the closest case-study to modern insurgency that the 
Americans faced.  The insurgency used a sophisticated albeit brutal approach to 
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population control and coercion as well as modern insurgent concepts of the erosion of 
political will on the domestic base of the invading military force.  It was in many ways 
very similar to Mao‘s approach a half-century later.  One scholar summarizes the Filipino 
insurgent strategy: 
…military victory was never the aim of Filipino leaders after 1899.  Instead, they 
hoped  to undermine America‘s will to continue the struggle by harassing U.S. 
military forces. The Filipinos were well aware that many Americans opposed the 
government‘s  adventure in imperialism, and they consciously played to this 
audience, timing their offensives to coincide with the presidential election of 
November 1900 in the hope that a disenchanted electorate would replace 
McKinley with the avowed anti-imperialist, William Jennings Bryan…the U.S. 
Army faced a formidable challenge in the Filipino resistance movement, 
incorporating as it did many of the characteristics of a modern guerrilla 
movement, including a politico-military organization, military and paramilitary 
units, and a strategy of political and guerrilla warfare.35      
 
In order to defeat this sophisticated mixture of political and military savvy, 
America was forced to rapidly adjust many elements of military doctrine, policy, and 
practice, devised from the past one hundred and twenty-five years of insurgency and 
counter-guerrilla warfare.  Essentially, America was moving in the direction of truly 
modern counterinsurgency and away from merely counter-guerrilla fighting, an approach 
more devoid of political and revolutionary zeal as an ideological foundation.  While not 
fully developed, the modern age of irregular warfare was an important part of the 
American military establishment, forcing it to move in many new unfamiliar and 
unconventional directions. 
 While many tactical modifications were developed during the Philippines 
campaign (e.g., an adaptation to jungle warfare), perhaps the most unique innovation was 
the strategic policy of ―attraction‖ as a parallel effort to practicing ―chastisement‖ (i.e., 
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the ―hard war‖ approach).  What this strategic policy shift meant was that the U.S. Army 
now understood the evolving nature of a ―people‘s war,‖ and the challenges of fighting 
such a war outside the American homeland and in a distinctly different cultural 
environment.  This is of profound importance, as the rules of domestic counterinsurgency 
are distinctly different from those of foreign counterinsurgency (e.g., understand of the 
culture, terrain, and population sentiments).  Additionally, the stakes were different from 
fighting on the American home front.  The difference was that when fighting in foreign 
lands, the American people had less tolerance for sustained casualties, while fighting on 
the home front meant the people on all sides had little choice but to endure larger 
casualties due to an often perceived ―existential‖ struggle.   
In order to adjust to these new constraints of domestic support, the U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps developed new socially-driven concepts to more rapidly ―win over‖ 
populations rather than continue the fight endlessly, which would have been intolerable 
to the voting American public now aware of overseas activities due to the emerging 
modern media.  Thus, the concept of ―attraction‖ was developed not merely by the U.S. 
Army, but by the administration of President McKinley itself, himself interested in 
maintain voter support.  President McKinley personally ordered the contingency 
commander, General Otis, to ―win the confidence, respect, and admiration of the 
inhabitants of the Philippines.‖36   The author goes on to describe General Otis: 
As the Army spread out over the Philippine archipelago, Otis and his commanders 
in the field followed these precepts closely. Ordering their men to respect the 
people and their customs, they imposed strict discipline, forbidding looting and 
wanton destruction and punishing those who committed such crimes. They paid in 
cash for supplies requisitioned from the populace, in an effort to win its favor and 
counter the mistrust engendered by insurgent propaganda.  They opened schools 
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staffed with soldier volunteers, built roads, refurbished markets and other public 
facilities.  Finally, the Army established municipal governments under native 
officials that were largely based upon Spanish traditions, both to provide basic 
governmental services to the community and to demonstrate America‘s 
commitment to political autonomy for the Philippines at the local level.37    
 
President McKinley, feeling strongly about the policy of ―attraction,‖ sent the 
future U.S. President William Howard Taft to ―supervise the transition from military to 
civilian rule in pacified areas.‖38 But Taft resided far from the insurgent conflict zones, 
and therefore held only limited credibility amongst the military leadership despite 
presidential backing by the Administration.  Yet, this partnership between senior U.S. 
representatives and the U.S. military serves as the first major example of civil-military 
approaches in counterinsurgency.  Although there were unmistakable personality and 
operational differences between Taft and the military commanders, many aspects worked 
well, given the popularity of Taft amongst Filipinos residing in the secure cities.  As one 
author writes, ―they effectively pursued a complementary two-pronged approach.  Taft 
emphasized the policy of ‗attraction‘ that, from the very beginning, had been an integral 
part of the army‘s occupation strategy.‖39  
Yet, as the war became prolonged, the policy of attraction became of less an 
interest to soldiers and their commanders who were on the front lines of a violent and 
deeply personal counterinsurgency effort.  Once General MacArthur assumed command 
from General Otis, he resolved to step up the more coercive efforts of the 
counterinsurgency.  MacArthur viewed General Otis‘s policies as too lenient, creating 
little strategic need for the insurgents to fold or at least compromise with the governing 
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authorities.  In many ways, lessons on ―chastisement‖ of insurgent-supporting population 
were resurrected from the Civil War and Indian Wars in hopes of raising the stakes to a 
degree that the population and the insurgency decided the costs were too high.  In turn, 
the hope was that this would motivate the insurgency to come to the negotiation table.  
Max Boot writes of the changing strategic dynamics: 
General Arthur MacArthur gave official sanction to policies designed to punish 
the insurrectos and their sympathizers, for he saw no other way to end the war 
quickly.  On December 20, 1900, he declared martial law over the islands and 
invoked General Orders 100 (GO 100).  Issued by President Lincoln in 1863 and 
widely imitated by other countries since, this landmark document envisioned war 
as a social contract: An occupying army had a duty to be humane in its dealings 
with civilians; to do otherwise would be stupid as well as immoral, for it would 
turn potential friends into foes. But likewise civilians had a duty not to resist; if 
they violated this duty, they would be dealt with harshly.  GO 100 held that 
combatants not in uniform would be treated like ―highway robbers and pirates‖ 
and, along with civilians who aided them, they could be subject to the death 
penalty…General William Tecumseh Sherman had invoked this order as he cut a 
swath of destruction through the South, and now MacArthur wanted to do the 
same in the Philippines.  His intent was to force the civilian population, especially 
the prominent families, to choose sides; neutrality would be considered akin to 
resistance and punished accordingly.40 
 
Unfortunately for some Filipinos, GO 100 was interpreted in more extreme ways 
by several commanders, leading to very coercive measures against the population.  In 
fact, unlawful violence in the conduct of counterinsurgency required that senior 
commanders, as well as Congress, step in and hold commanders more accountable for 
their actions, particularly due to growing public outrage of the conflict.  Toward the end 
of the Philippines campaign, in January 1902, ―the Senate committee had begun hearings 
on atrocities…witnesses testified about the ―water cure‖ [a torture method designed to 
extract confessions, even more severe than the modern ―water boarding‖ technique], 
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about villages being burned, and about other extreme steps that had become part of this 
dirty little war.‖41   
To finally end the conflict, the military turned to a ―tried and true‖ method of 
separating the insurgents from the population: the use of protected and military supplied 
camps for civilians residing in the region (a strategy used with success by the British in 
Malaya, and to a limited degree by General Petraeus in Iraq).  The tactic is designed to 
cut off the insurgents from those in the population who may pay taxes or supply food to 
the insurgents.  Essentially, it removed logistical support from the insurgency and made it 
easier for armies to distinguish the enemy from the civilian.  But like most endeavors in 
war, the camps created additional suffering and even death, primarily due to increased 
disease due to the large numbers of people in crowded and unsanitary conditions.  Boot 
elaborates: 
Setting up ―concentration camps‖ (not to be confused with death camps) was a 
traditional counterinsurgency tactics, then being used by the British South Africa 
and previously employed by the U.S. Army in its campaigns against the Indians, 
where the camps had been called ―reservations.‖  The goal was to separate the 
insurgent from the population base, for as Mao Tse-tung later explained, ―the 
guerrilla moves among the people as the fish through the water.‖  With more than 
300,000 people clustering in his ―zones of protection,‖ Bell [Brigadier General J. 
Franklin Bell, tasked with this policy of separating of the insurgents and the 
civilian] succeeded in drying up the guerrillas‘ water. To finish off the 
insurgency, he sent 4,000 soldiers to search ―each ravine, valley, and mountain 
peak for insurgents and for food,‖ destroying all foodstuffs and capturing or 
killing all able-bodied men.  This unrelenting pressure quickly paid off.  On April 





In sum, the Philippines insurgency was a modern insurgency in that it blended 
population-based tactics to win the ―hearts and minds‖ of the locals with sophisticated 
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modern communications aimed at U.S. domestic politics.  By utilizing tactics aimed at 
influencing the American population, the Filipino insurgent leadership demonstrated 
what Mao would later coin as one of his three main elements of a successful insurgency, 
the use of popular ―will.‖  What Mao realized and wrote about, and what the Philippines 
insurgency practiced several decades before Mao‘s book, was that an insurgency must 
have the support of the domestic population while simultaneously attempting to erode 
domestic support on the home-front of the invading army.  However, the Filipino 
insurgent leadership failed to understand a critical requirement of eroding the American 
domestic political will—the need to prolong the war as long as possible.  The Filipino 
leadership failed badly at protracted warfare.  As it was, the insurgency was only able to 
carry out an ebb-and-flow insurgency of approximately four years.  In an age of slow 
international communications, this was far too short for protracted warfare advantages to 
take hold.   
Secondly, the Filipino leadership understood the need to extend the invading army 
as much as possible.  Mao also recognized this tactic decades later, seeking to weaken an 
army by thinning them out over large geographical terrain.
43
  In turn, this thinning along 
outposts stretched across a large region left armies more vulnerable to random ambushes 
that were difficult to predict in size and scope.  While this worked to a degree, a major 
constraint which plagued the insurgent leadership was that their geographical terrain was 
limited to a series of small islands which were relatively easy to isolate, when compared 
to a large geographical landmass with transnational borders to slip across for protection.  
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In addition, ethnic boundaries created a form of ―social boundaries‖ similar to 
geographical boundaries in that it limited the insurgents‘ freedom of movement as well as 
popular support for the insurgents.  Thus, many effective tactics were not easy to put into 
practice despite the relatively modest number of American soldiers in the Philippines.   
All these many important factors aside, the most significant weakness of the 
insurgency in the Philippines was that they lacked a deep popular-based ideology.  In the 
modern age, insurgencies often utilize religion or revolutionary ideology to unite their 
followers.  The only consistent message by the Filipino insurgent leadership to their 
people was that the Philippines should be sovereign, hardly a resounding war cry for the 
many Filipinos who either disagreed or saw no suitable local alternative to American 
governorship.  Additionally, the sectarian and ethnic tensions fractured a unified vision of 
leadership.   
Thus, while the Philippines insurgency represents one of the first modern 
insurgencies in which the Americans were involved, a host of unique challenges 
prevented many of the required tactics from being effective.  What can be concluded is 
that the Philippines insurgency was a harbinger of things to come, as it came to inform 
subsequent generations of the requirements to wage a successful politically-based 
insurgency against a conventionally more powerful adversary.  While it lacked a large 
homogenously-driven ethnic and ideological base in which to build a support-base, it did 
bring to the fore the validity of using sophisticated strategic communications aimed at the 
adversary‘s domestic population.  The insurgency also sought to utilize methods well 
ahead of its time: the very methods that Mao Tse-tung became famous for— the strategy 
of protracted warfare, stretching the opposition forces, propagandizing, and controlling 
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the population.  Equally as impressive were the counterinsurgency adaptations, which 
utilized cutting edge approaches to working with local populations, including the 
employment of locals, weapons buy-back programs, and the study of culture among the 
U.S. Army—all of which then served as revolutionary ―hearts and minds‖ tactics.44    
Also noteworthy are the ―hard‖ methods which were employed during the 
Philippines campaign, many that are now deemed war crimes by modern standards, 
particularly the use of the ―water cure‖ and other related methods currently defined as 
torture.  However, for the sake of a deeper understanding of the era, one should 
understand that ethics of warfare have advanced since the pre-Geneva Convention era.  
Furthermore, as scholars point out, many of these activities were taken from the pages of 
domestic American police operations against criminals in that era, which often used even 
harsher methods to extract confessions and mete out punishment.
45
  In short, the 
Philippines campaign at the turn of the twentieth century serves as an example of 
numerous successful and unsuccessful insurgency and counterinsurgency methods, 
making it an invaluable case-study.  As will be examined, future insurgent leaders, such 
as Mao Tse-tung, seized upon these historical lessons, tailoring them to their own needs. 
 
The Small Wars Years 
Over the decades following the Philippines campaign, America was involved in 
an extensive series of small engagements, many to secure and stabilize America‘s 
overseas corporate interests.  The overwhelming majority of these small wars were in 
Latin America and Asia, where the modern U.S. Marine Corps came of age and earned 
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the nickname as the ―State Department‘s troops.‖46  As one author noted about Nicaragua 
in 1909, ―U.S. bankers ran the economy and American officials supervised elections.  A 
Legation Guard of Marines, stationed in the capital city of Managua, kept internal 
peace.‖47  Such was the case due to the overwhelming number of these small wars being 
engaged for immediate political and commercial interests.  These engagements, however, 
left an indelible mark on the U.S. Marine Corps, so much so that they wrote the first true 
U.S. military manual, and thus doctrine, on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.  The 
Marine Corps titled this manual Small Wars Manual.48  Printed in 1940, it was designed 
to draw ―best practices‖ from the British version of a similar publication titled, Small 
Wars,49 printed in 1906 as Britain struggled to maintain its empire.  Thus, as America 
dabbled in imperialism in the early 1900s, it sought to glean lessons from other past 
empires as they too struggled to maintain economic dominance through military force. 
But the age of the modern insurgency and counterinsurgency came in the era of 
China‘s Mao Tse-tung, after his successful effort to overthrow the Chinese government 
and install a Communist regime.  For the first time a successful insurgent leader who 
specialized in insurgency as a primary means of warfare wrote a book and defined the 
requirements of insurgent warfare, albeit an approach focused on rural-based populations. 
Mao illustrated that although patriotic partisan resistance utilizing guerrilla warfare 
existed for thousands of years, more was needed to achieve success. As one scholar 
wrote, ―The fundamental difference between patriotic partisan resistance and 
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revolutionary guerrilla movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological content 
that always distinguishes the second.‖50  Because of Mao‘s success and ―doctrine‖ that 
seized upon the combination of revolutionary fervor and guerrilla warfare, Maoist styled 
insurgencies began moving to the fore in modern warfare.   
What Mao successfully highlighted was that political ideology is an absolute 
requisite for any successful insurgency campaign.  Essentially, it makes the common 
peasant feel part of a greater and more important whole.  He also emphasized that 
guerrilla warfare tactics, conventional warfare tactics, and political ideology cannot be 
divorced from one another.  They must be synergistic, and these elements of 
revolutionary warfare must complement each other and be brought to bear at the 
appropriate times (e.g., in phases).  Mao articulated these differences in his landmark 
book, On Guerrilla Warfare.  In one such passage, Mao writes: 
What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan?  It is one aspect of the entire 
war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the 
enemy  in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases 
our national strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic 
instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of 
anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active 
people and inseparable from them.  It is a powerful special weapon with which we 
resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.51 
 
Following the success of Mao in China, Maoist ideology grew in popularity and 
spread into many global regions.  One of these areas was North Vietnam, where Ho Chi 
Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap, the most prominent military commander under Ho 
Chi Minh, employed the strategy and tactics of Mao with tremendous success, first 
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against the French and later against the Americans and South Vietnamese.  Mirroring 
Mao‘s tactics of ―space, time, and will,‖52 General Giap writes in almost identical style: 
In the resistance war, guerrilla activity played an extremely important role… this 
is the way of fighting a revolution.  Guerrillas rely on heroic spirit to triumph over 
modern weapons…now scattering, now regrouping, now wearing out, now 
exterminating the enemy, they are determined to fight everywhere, so that 
wherever the enemy goes he is submerged in a sea of armed people who hit back 
at him, thus undermining his spirit and exhausting his forces.53 
 
Like Mao, General Giap understood and articulated the need to mix guerrilla 
warfare tactics with strong political ideology, which served as its unifying base in 
garnering sustainable popular support.  On this, General Giap writes,  
The People‘s Army was closely linked with the national liberation war, in the fire 
of which it was born and grew up… right at the founding of our army, the first 
armed  groups and platoons had their Party groups and branches. The platoons 
had their political commissars. As soon as they were formed, the regiments had 
political commissars. The method of Party committee taking the lead and the 
commander allotting the work also took shape from the very first days.  Officers 
were provided with handbooks, The Political Commissar‘s Book of Political 
Work in the Army.54 
 
As is demonstrated by General Giap‘s writings, North Vietnam had an organized 
insurgency and a well articulated revolutionary political platform from which to operate 
by the time the Americans arrived in Vietnam.  Further, the North Vietnamese had 
already defeated a strong Western power, the French, and strongly resisted Japanese 
forces during World War II.  These experienced made the North Vietnamese some of the 
most practiced and capable insurgent fighters in the world at that time. To counter the 
North Vietnamese‘s considerable capacity, the Americans attempted to rapidly develop 
equally sophisticated approaches to counterinsurgency.   
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Among the most sophisticated approaches to counterinsurgency were the non-
lethal approaches which ran often in parallel to the military‘s main effort of using 
overwhelming firepower.  Among the earliest nonlethal counterinsurgency approach in 
Vietnam was the Rural Affairs program, beginning in 1961, heavily focused on the 
―Strategic Hamlets.‖  The Strategic Hamlets were considered strategically important 
villages in which to begin the displacement of the Viet Cong (VC) from southern 
Vietnam.  The Strategic Hamlet program drew on an earlier counterinsurgency concept 
known as the ―Oil Stain Theory‖55 which advocated clearing insurgents from a small 
geographical area, often a village or district, and showing quick yet meaningful results to 
the local population—such as better local government, enhanced local security, and 
reconstruction projects that improve the quality of life (e.g. clinics, schools, hospitals, 
markets, etc.).  To provide these results to the local population, the Vietnamese 
government, in concert with the U.S., developed three overarching goals for the Strategic 
Hamlets.  
First, the government would tie the people in fortified hamlets into a 
communications network, providing them with local defense forces to ward off 
guerrilla raids and stationing reaction forces nearby in case of emergency.  
Second, the program would strive to unite the people and involve them in 
governmental affairs.  Third, the program would improve living standards.56 
 
Despite the historical success which the Strategic Hamlet program was drawn 
from, such as the British Malayan campaign, bureaucratic inertia and interagency 
quarrelling spelled its undoing.  From the earliest days in Vietnam, several agencies 
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failed to effectively partner, and in the case of the Strategic Hamlets, State Department 
and the Defense Department proved to be incompatible.  Quite simply, ideological 
differences were insurmountable due to inflexibility and limited conceptual 
understanding by numerous agency leads.  Richard Hunt, a scholar of Vietnam 
―Pacification,‖57 writes: 
Two of the main players, The Departments of State and Defense, proved 
unwilling to yield substantive control over their respective programs in South 
Vietnam.  Furthermore, agencies disagreed as to whether political or military 
measures deserved an agencies, such as State and AID, argued that programs to 
win political loyalty and to ameliorate living conditions had to be first because 
they were prerequisites for establishing local security.  Others countered that it 
was impossible to win the loyalty of  people susceptible to communist taxation, 
terrorism, or levies.  These disagreements reflected uncertainty within the 
administration as to the nature of the Viet Cong threat and the appropriate 
response.58 
 
The Vietnam campaign was further plagued by an inability to agree upon a single 
strategy, a result of these agencies‘ differing ideological and technical approaches to 
counterinsurgency.  From the earliest years of America‘s involvement in Vietnam, 
continuous conflicts occurred between those advocating a more military focused 
(―kinetic‖) approach to displace and demoralize the North Vietnamese guerrillas and 
regulars while others advocated an approach focused on winning popular support through 
nonviolent counterinsurgency approaches.  Many of these nonviolent approaches 
involved such activities as partnering with village level counterinsurgent militias, 
building local infrastructure, and enhancing the governance capacity of local officials.  
All too often in the minds of military commanders and policy makers, a full 
understanding of how these two approaches complement one another was never 
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understood, failing to draw lessons from similar historical American experiences 
including the Civil War, the Indian Wars, the Philippines, and the Small Wars throughout 
Latin America.  In short, lessons were lost, perpetuating the problem of developing a 
sound counterinsurgency strategy.  To illustrate, Hunt writes, ―As U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps units arrived in 1965, pacification became known as the ―other war,‖ a patronizing 
usage that stigmatized the program‘s status as a noble but failing endeavor that was no 
longer the main event.‖59 
While many modern counterinsurgency practitioners understand that sound 
counterinsurgency strategies cannot be comprised of an unbalanced proportion of kinetic 
tactics (raids, bombings, etc.) versus nonviolent tactics (reconstruction, mitigating local 
population grievances, etc.), many leaders in Vietnam failed to implement such a 
balanced approach.  The series of nonlinear strategies leaned on one solution or the other, 
whether in pre-1965, focused on an under-resourced pacification approach or the 
emphasis on kinetic warfare post-1965.  The end result was that the strategy debate raged 
as to whether or not to drop more bombs on North Vietnam or inversely, reduce the 
violence and focus on infrastructure and local institutional capacity.  The debate did not 
argue for a balance of the two and failed to resolve how best to blend the lethal versus 
nonlethal approach and seize upon lessons learned and best practices.   
Achieving a well-developed and balanced approach required thought on how best 
to avoid undermining other agencies‘ efforts.  In Vietnam, this challenge was never 
understood and certainly not overcome by U.S. leadership, with one agency feeding the 
problems of other agencies due to nonaligned strategies.  Because of this, problems 
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became so deeply cyclical and entrenched that solving them became nearly impossible.  
Examples of this phenomenon are numerous.  Hunt discusses this problem demonstrating 
how nonaligned strategies perpetuated larger problems for other agencies (e.g., USAID, 
State Department, South Vietnamese government): 
Military operations of American and South Vietnamese forces also hampered 
pacification by generating refugees.  In the judgment of a major study on war 
victims, allied operations were the principle cause of refugees in South Vietnam.  
This occurred  in several ways.  Artillery and air strikes in preparation for an 
operation frequently fell on populated areas, forcing people to flee…Chemical 
defoliation of suspected communist base areas also caused people to move when 
the drifting spray damaged crops.  In the course of operations, friendly forces 
sometimes attacked inhabited villages in pursuit of the enemy.  On other 
occasions, enemy soldiers hiding in settlements fired at friendly forces hoping to 
provoke retaliatory fire that might kill or wound or destroy  property or crops and 
thus alienate people.60 
 
The Vietnam civil-military model, called CORDS, was established in 1967, in an 
attempt to unify civil and military organizations to focus on counterinsurgency.  For the 
first time, the nonlethal counterinsurgency organizations were placed under a single 
manager, more effectively and efficiently utilizing resources.  However, by 1967, the 
nonlethal approach to counterinsurgency was no longer the driving strategy, as the desire 
for increased military force became dominant.  Yet, CORDS achieved substantial gains in 
pacification, often touted as one of the few success stories from Vietnam.  CORDS and 
the larger nonlethal approach remained merely a subtext to the larger Vietnam conflict.  
As the architect of the CORDS model noted, ―Even after 1967, pacification remained a 
small tail to the very large conventional military dog.‖61 
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Following Vietnam, America went through a period which avoided 
counterinsurgency as a primary means of warfare.  Essentially, counterinsurgency 
became a highly specialized form of war kept as far from the front pages as possible.  It 
became the raison d‘être of such organizations of the U.S. Special Forces and similar 
organizations.  The focus of American foreign policy shifted instead to the Cold War and 
the emerging nuclear age of potentially large-scale catastrophic warfare.  To illustrate, 
Robert W. Komer, the architect of the Vietnam CORDS program, shifted focus to 
conventional nuclear naval strategy.  Following Vietnam, Komer rarely mentioned 
counterinsurgency warfare except during individual interviews. 
But despite this overwhelming focus on conventional war, particularly nuclear 
strategy driven by the Cold War mentality, the fact that insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies still raged was well known to the foreign policy community.  Many 
of these insurgencies and counterinsurgencies were driven by Cold War maneuvering, 
including proxy wars, utilizing insurgents and counterinsurgents as proxies in building 
satellite states and ever-shifting ―footprints‖ of political influence.  Examples of such 
irregular wars are numerous, including but not limited to, Nicaragua, Cuba, Congo, 
Columbia, and Afghanistan (Soviet era).  While these insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies did involve U.S. governmental organizations, the levels of support 
were characterized as much more limited in scale as well as having far less overt 
involvement than modern examples, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and historic examples 
of the Philippines and the Indian Wars. Furthermore, most of the Cold War insurgencies 
and counterinsurgencies were kept limited as the U.S. Government saw little strategic 
value in advertising their involvement in numerous ―hot spots‖ around the world, serving 
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only to inflame the already troubled relationship with the Soviets.  What was distinctly 
different between the Cold War periods of irregular conflict and today is that during the 
Cold War the U.S. sought to have limited U.S. involvement and much greater local 
leadership involvement.  In other words, it was to have a ―local face‖ on the conflict 
rather than a U.S. face. Today, the U.S. has leading roles in two major simultaneous 
counterinsurgencies while involved in other smaller-scale efforts, such as antipiracy off 
the coast of Somalia. 
The first major overt American counterinsurgency effort to follow after Vietnam 
was the campaign to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan in 2001.  This 
effort initially began as a classic counterterrorism (CT) campaign as a response to 
September 11, 2001.  The U.S. government had few other options to the CT approach as 
only a small number of civilian and military personnel were capable of irregular warfare 
tactics and strategy.  This was a symptom of the lengthy Cold War with most resources 
applied to conventional warfare capability, an approach that refrained from using 
conventional forces for irregular war.  Thus, such organization as the U.S. military‘s 
Special Forces (SF) and the CIA‘s paramilitary remained the few irregular warfare 
experts within the U.S. government.  However, even these groups knew little about the 
larger aspects of counterinsurgency, such as the nonlethal aspects which Mao Tse-tung 
expounded upon.  The DoD‘s Civil Affairs Units and civilian agencies such as USAID 
maintained the institutional knowledge on nonlethal approaches, but were out of practice 
having performed limited missions on par with Afghanistan and Iraq, yet did have 
experience from Kosovo and smaller-scale experience from Columbia.  Further, despite 
experience gained in small hot-spots, SF and CIA paramilitary numbers were far too 
56 
 
small for such large geographical areas as Afghanistan to operate meaningfully.62  Once 
surgical and often highly violent counter-terrorism (CT) operations concluded, what 
remained was a dangerous void in governance and security, with no effective indigenous 
security forces or government in place.  With such voids, militants and criminals quickly 
emerged on the streets causing new and unresolved conflict to reemerge, placing 
enormous strain on nascent governance structures. Thus, what inevitably began as CT 
quickly devolved into a much more intensive classic counterinsurgency campaign.   
The need for rapid change across the U.S. government to deal with the large-scale 
counterinsurgency conflicts was a seismic shift in the function and structure of the U.S. 
government.  This restructuring rapidly began drawing in numerous governmental 
players into counterinsurgency, many which have never had a historical role in such 
efforts.  The restructuring and realignment of responsibilities across the interagency, 
much as Vietnam did decades before, quickly escalated from being the Defense 
Department‘s problem to now deeply involving the Department of State (DoS), U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Treasury, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Homeland 
Security (e.g., Customs and Border Patrol), and others.  With these changes, the U.S. 
entered into the age of what has now become termed by some as the ―Whole-of-
Government‖ approach to counterinsurgency.   
To illustrate, on January 2009, the first ever U.S. Government-wide 
counterinsurgency manual was written, which emphasized the point that interagency and 
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intergovernmental coordination was essential to achieve success in modern 
counterinsurgency environments. On this new and emerging issue, the manual 
highlighted the importance of interagency and international strategic coordination, 
writing:  
…the success of the USG in helping other nations to defeat insurgencies will 
often be dependent on its proficiency at coordinating all committed agencies and 
resources (including its own, those of the affected nation, and those of 
international partners) towards a common objective. The first requirement for the 
U.S. is that it must synchronize its own agencies in a ‗whole-of-government‘ 
understanding and approach. The second requirement is that it exercises sufficient 
diplomatic skill to coax, guide and assist the affected nation through the necessary 
steps of planning and execution to regain legitimacy and control. In situations 
where other coalition partners are involved, that diplomatic acumen must extend 
to maintaining the coalition and ensuring that partner efforts are woven as 
effectively as possible into the overall COIN strategy.63 
 
In many ways, Afghanistan represents a shift in the American way of war.  While 
history has demonstrated many examples of civilian agencies operating in conflict zones 
alongside the military, more often than not, these roles are outside of open conflict zones.  
Never before has there been such wide acceptance of noncombatant civilians serving 
routinely alongside soldiers in open conflict.  This shift can be attributed largely to the 
Vietnam War, where civilians played a large part of the effort.  Following the hard 
lessons from the Vietnam experience, the failure opened the eyes of many policy makers 
to the fact that a violence-based answer to counterinsurgency is often not the right 
approach.  The result of these lessons was that when the Afghanistan front opened, 
immediately complex sociological, diplomatic, development, and military science 
concepts were embraced by international policy makers including the need to reevaluate 
interagency counterinsurgency approaches (e.g., doctrine and policy) on how the U.S. 
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and international community was to respond in Afghanistan.  A few of the influential 
manuals that came to fruition include books and sources as FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency; 
FM 3-07, Stability Operations; the U.S Institute of Peace (USIP), and the U.S. Army 
Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute‘s (PKSOI) Guiding Principles for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Governments Counterinsurgency Guide, and a 
host of other journals and websites. 
Perhaps the most salient and palpable shift in doctrine and approach to complex 
counterinsurgencies is demonstrated in the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept, an 
organizational blend of soldiers and civilian agency personnel merged into one cohesive 
team.  These teams represent and epitomize what has now become known as the ―Whole-
of-Government‖ approach to counterinsurgency and stabilization.  To understand the 
Whole-of-Government, we must turn to the literature.  This constantly growing body of 
literature provides evidence of conceptual changes by the military and civilian agencies 
over time.  The most influential documents include the doctrinal and policy making 
literature covering interagency counterinsurgency approaches, something historically 
absent with the exception of traces existing in the early stages in Vietnam.  One major 
exception was a handbook written by the United States Operations Mission to Vietnam 
(USOM), Office of Rural Affairs. 64  USOM‘s book was drafted for USAID‘s Rural 
Affairs effort, but the target audience was both USAID and interagency field officers 
arriving in theater in 1963 and after.  This field guide essentially served as one of the first 
true interagency handbooks and mirrors much of what is written in today‘s PRT 
handbooks.  The U.S. Army‘s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) drafted the 
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Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook,65 the latest version was heavily 
amended drawing on lessons learned from the field over the past decade.  The handbook 
illustrates many of the numerous changes undertaken by the U.S. government in the 
attempt to blend and coordinate numerous organizations within the larger Afghanistan 
strategic framework.   
Perhaps the most salient issues found in this document and others are the 
distinctly articulated shifts in U.S. Government military doctrine.  The handbook, in 
collaboration with such high profile military doctrines as FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
and FM 3-07, Stability Operations, serves as a formal and highly publicized DoD 
endorsement embracing the interagency in strategic and tactical decision making.  While 
the DoD remains dominant in most circles in Afghanistan, if for no other reason than 
their sheer resources, this prointeragency shift by the DoD is largely unprecedented—
certainly prior to Vietnam.  While the Philippines and the early Vietnam experience 
provided foreshadowing of interagency cooperation and synchronization, never was the 
effort more clearly articulated and advocated than in Afghanistan with the formation of 
the PRTs and the creation of the doctrine that supports these interagency 
counterinsurgency teams.   
In Afghanistan, the PRTs serve a unique role in counterinsurgency.  The PRT‘s 
primary mandate in Afghanistan is defined in the NATO PRT Handbook: 
  The PRT mission statement, which has been incorporated into the ISAF 
Operational Plan, is as follows: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will 
assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to 
facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified 
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area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction 
efforts.66 
 
Since the Vietnam CORDS experiment, never have civilian and military 
counterinsurgency practitioners been so closely intertwined at the operational and tactical 
levels.  However, the core differences with CORDS were that while integration took 
place spatially, they remained under home agency authority.  In other words, USAID 
answered to the USAID Mission Headquarters in Kabul, State Department answered to 
the Embassy, and the Department of Defense answered to their own commands.  The 
Vietnam CORDS program intentionally avoided agency stove-piping by having CORDS 
be a self-contained organization.  Never again before or after Vietnam did the military 
and civilian agencies organize in such a way.  Thus, the Afghanistan PRTs remain 
collectively interagency, but hierarchically differentiated.  Unfortunately, this did not 
mitigate substantial stove-piping, as we will examine later. 
The Iraq PRTs are similar in almost all regards with one major exception.  The 
Iraq PRTs operate and are led by the State Department.  However, the concept is nearly 
identical to the Afghanistan PRTs with the exception that again the PRT Team Leader is 
a State Department Officer.  Other differences also exist, such as the approach to metrics, 
but operationally, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan remain very similar.  
Nevertheless, The Iraq and Afghanistan PRTs have achieved success in critical 
areas, such as the blending and aligning of civil and military capabilities into one 
coherent team.  Other benefits include better civil-military strategic and resource 
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synchronization of stabilization and a more enhanced unified effort, working more in 
concert rather than at cross-purposes seen frequently before the development of civil-
military team concepts pioneered in Vietnam. Yet, as will be examined, major systemic 
and methodological challenges characterize civil-military teams in both Afghanistan and 




STABILITY OPERATIONS: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE 
In an atypical situation that cried out for adaptive solutions, institutional 
constraints generated a business as usual approach.  A bureaucracy tends 
to adjust a given policy rather than change its structure to reflect a new 




 fundamentally altered America‘s perspective on national security.   
Examining the causes of the attacks and the responses required to diminish the likelihood 
of future attacks, the Bush Administration undertook a comprehensive national security 
review. Two significant findings emerged: first, contemporary threats facing the United 
States could not be mitigated by military force alone and second, it is necessary to 
stabilize weak or failed states in order to diminish the grievances terrorists and other 
spoilers use to mobilize support. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
acknowledged this new international environment. It recognized changes in the 
international environment and for the first time, declared fragile and conflict states a 
threat to U.S. security.  Consequently, ―stabilizing‖ these countries became a foreign 
policy goal. The Obama administration‘s May 2010 NSS reiterated this threat: ―…we 
must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable 
radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to 
manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common 
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challenges.‖67 Nevertheless, U.S. responses to instable environments continue to be ad 
hoc and in most cases, ineffective. While there are numerous challenges which limit U.S. 
effectiveness, a key constraint is the lack of practical tools for civilian and military field 
personnel conducting stability operations. This paper examines the features of Stability 
Operations: reasons why bureaucratic, doctrinal, and policy changes have not had an 
effect at the operational and tactical levels; and how the use of USAID‘s District 
Stabilization Framework (DSF) can help practitioners conduct more effectively conduct 
Stability Operations. 
 
Conducting Effective Stability Operations 
The 2002 NSS led to a number of bureaucratic and policy changes. In 2004, the 
Department of State (DoS) established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization (S/CRS).  It was charged with coordinating the country‘s postconflict 
and stabilization efforts. In 2005, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) created an Office of Military Affairs. Its mission was to serve as USAID‘s focal 
point for civilian-military planning and interaction with the DoD and foreign militaries.  
New policies were also adopted.  On November 28, 2005, the Department of Defense 
published Directive 3000.05. It established stability operations as a core U.S. military 
mission with the same priority as combat operations. Over the next few years, the DoD 
also issued new military doctrine (FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency; FM 3-07, Stability 
Operations).  FM 3-07 defines stability operations as the ―various military missions, 
tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 
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instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe, secure environment, 
provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 
humanitarian relief.‖68 Complementing changing military doctrine, in 2009 the U.S. 
Institute of Peace offered a civilian perspective on Reconstruction and Stabilization 
operations: ―Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.‖69 As with most 
doctrine, this definition is broadly framed to give units flexibility in dynamic and 
complex environments. While useful at the strategic level, this broad definition does not 
help field practitioners beyond the theoretical understanding of counterinsurgency or 
stabilization. American experience in unstable environments such as Vietnam, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Philippines, Somalia, and Haiti demonstrates the 
difficulty in effectively conducting Stability Operations.70 There are numerous reasons for 
this situation. Although addressing these challenges requires strong leadership and a 
willingness to take on the formidable task of changing bureaucratic structures and 
procedures,71 there are some challenges which could be quickly mitigated.  
 Since both civilian and military practitioners have little or no stability operations 
training before they deploy,72 they rely on their previous experience or narrow technical 
                                                 
68
 Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 2009) viii. 
69
U.S. Institute of Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington D.C.: The 
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009). 
70
 Patrick Stewart noted ―the United States is still struggling to craft the strategies, mobilize the resources, 
and align the policy instruments it needs to help reform and reconstruct failing, failed, and war-torn states.‖ 
Patrick Stewart, ―The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obstacle to 
Coherence,‖ in Center for Global Development (July 2007) 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/14093/ (accessed January 17, 2011) 
71
 They include training shortfalls, short deployment cycles, inappropriate programming resources, and 
misguided ‗measures of success. James Derleth and Sloan Mann, ―Getting Stability Right,‖ (unpublished 
article, 2010). 
72
 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), U.S. Civilian Uplift in 
Afghanistan is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit Further Examination as Implementation Continues, 
(October 26, 2010) 12. 
65 
 
education. As an illustration, the vast majority of USAID Field Program Officers (FPOs) 
in Afghanistan are either humanitarian or development specialists. This means their 
previous experience was focused on resolving human development challenges. Military 
practitioners also rely on their experience and assumptions. For example, many 
commanders believe proficiency in core combat skills gives soldiers and marines the 
ability to effectively conduct stability operations. This could not be further from the truth. 
Training in identifying sources of instability, developing missions and activities to 
mitigate them, and creating indicators for measuring local stability are just a few of the 
critical tasks required to conduct effective stability operations. Without the requisite 
training, military units fall back on what they know best – enemy centric operations.  As 
a brigade staff officer told us, our current doctrine and training requirements do not 
support stability operations.‖73 
Military units trained to work with the population (e.g., Civil Affairs), share many 
of their civilian counterparts‘ biases. They believe if they improve the level of 
development in an area, e.g., provide potable water, educational opportunities, health 
care, infrastructure, etc., the area will become more stable. Often, one of the first things 
Civil Affairs soldiers and marines do when they arrive in an area of operations is conduct 
a ―needs assessment.‖74 While a traditional ―needs assessment‖ may foster development 
in a stable environment, research clearly shows this is not the case in unstable 
environments. This is because conditions in unstable environments, e.g., insecurity, 
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endemic corruption, a war economy, limited governmental legitimacy, are different from 
those in stable environments.75  
It should therefore come as no surprise that mistaken assumptions have led to 
ineffective programming. When we asked one Field Program Officer (FPO) what 
stability programming meant to him, he said ―good development in an unstable 
environment.‖ This is patently wrong!  Research shows development in an instable 
environment often fosters more instability if complex local factors are not properly 
identified.  At a recent international aid conference, international practitioners from 
numerous global aid agencies concluded:  
a) Aid seems to be losing, rather than winning, hearts and minds in Afghanistan 
b) Development and counterinsurgency policies should acknowledge the 
potentially destabilizing effects of aid 
c) Less is more—too much aid can be destabilizing 





Stability Operations Programming 
Effective stability operations programming requires a methodology focused on 
identifying and diminishing local sources of instability, NOT addressing the perceived 
―needs‖ of the population.  Most developing countries have a myriad of needs.  
Extremists/insurgents aren‘t usually building roads, providing health care, or digging 
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wells. Yet they are able to gain support in the population. What explains this 
phenomenon? Extremists/insurgents are able to ameliorate the priority grievances of the 
population because they understand the local community.  
Priority grievances are things a significant percentage of locals—not outsiders--
identify as important to their community. Examples might include potable water, 
educational opportunities, infrastructure, security, justice, etc. Priority grievances can be 
needs.  The difference is (1) who identifies the issue – the community, because it is a 
concern for them or an outside ―expert‖ who assesses the situation based on common 
development models; and (2) whether a significant percentage of the population identify 
the issue as a priority. For example, in Afghanistan the Taliban have gained support 
because they provide Sharia courts to deal with crime and local disputes, both major 
grievances in the country.77  As one member of the Afghan Parliament noted: ―… people 
go to them [Taliban] because their justice is quick and seen as more effective than normal 
justice."78 
Therefore, to stabilize an area, practitioners must be able to identify, prioritize, 
and diminish sources of instability (SOI). Sources of instability are usually a small subset 
of priority grievances. They are SOIs because they (1) directly undermine support for the 
government, (2) increase support for insurgents, or (3) otherwise disrupt the normal 
functioning of society. Examples include:  
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October 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/asia/08taliban.html (accessed January 17, 
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a) In a conflict between two tribes, one tribe allies itself with the insurgents because 
the rival tribe controls the local government (e.g., resources, patronage, etc.). 
b) Insurgents take advantage of a priority grievance (land conflicts) to gain/expand 
influence in the community by convening a Sharia court to resolve the land 
conflicts.    
This subset must be identified through an analytical process. Noteworthy, field analysis 
often determines that the actual source of instability is one or more steps removed from a 
grievance cited by the community. For example, although locals cite water as a problem, 
analysis might show the underlying source of instability which created the water issue is 
competition between two tribes over a borehole.  
SOIs usually cannot be addressed by a simple infrastructure project, e.g., building 
a road. However, a road may be a part of the solution. For example, if two tribes do not 
get along, getting them to cooperate in the process of building a road may help resolve 
the SOI.  Note the infrastructure project is incidental to the problem. It is the process of 
cooperating to build the road which is important. Another example: if the government‘s 
failure to maintain a district irrigation system is being turned into an SOI by insurgent 
propaganda, a project that simply brings in an outside contractor to fix the canals will not 
necessarily increase support for the government. Why?  If the government cannot 
maintain the repaired canals, then it will continue to be seen as ineffective, fostering 
increased popular frustration. Instead, the project should be conducted by the community 
with government support in order to increase the government and/or society‘s capability 
and capacity to maintain the canals in the future.  In summary, the goal of stability 
programming is identifying and targeting the local sources of instability, i.e., the issues 
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which undermine the government, increase support for extremists/insurgents, and/or 
disrupt the normal functioning of society.  Once an area is stable, practitioners can 
address needs and priority grievances through traditional development assistance. 
 
The District Stabilization Framework (DSF) 
US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq generated an extensive range of stability 
operations literature. It generally falls into two categories: broad strategic policy and 
tactical ―best practices‖ based on an individual or unit‘s experience. Only a few 
publications, such as David Kilcullen‘s ―28 Articles‖79 and FM 3.24.2 
―Counterinsurgency Tactics,‖80 attempt to provide a coherent set of tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) for tactical units. These attempts notwithstanding, there is 
overwhelming need for a simple, standardized methodology to conduct stability 
operations. While some field personnel have created tools and processes which helped 
them stabilize an area, most have not been as successful. Recognizing the need for a 
comprehensive framework which allows civilian and military practitioners to identify 
local sources of instability, create activities to mitigate them, and measure the 
effectiveness of the activities in stabilizing the area, the Office of Military Affairs at the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) created the District Stabilization 
Framework (DSF). The DSF is based on the idea that in order to increase stability in an 
area, practitioners must first understand what is causing instability.  This understanding is 
based on four factors: 
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1. Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of 
the government or society to mitigate these factors 
2. A standardized methodology is necessary to identify the sources of instability  
3. Local population perceptions must be included when identifying causes of 
instability 
4. Measures of effect (impact) are the only true indicators of success 
Through a five-step process (collection and situational awareness, analysis, 
design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation), the District Stabilization 
Framework identifies sources of instability, designs programs to mitigate them, and 
measures the effectiveness of the programming in stabilizing an area.  
 
Collection and Situational Awareness 
The first step is to gain a stability-focused understanding of environment. Four 
types of information are required to gain an understanding of local conditions:   
 operational81 
 cultural (major groups, their interests, conflict resolution mechanisms, traditional 
authorities, limits to their power, how spoilers leverage these factors) 
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 A useful tool to collect operational information is the PMESII/ASCOPE framework. PMESII/ASCOPE 
is a doctrinal framework traditionally used by the military to identify the civil components in an area of 
operations.  PMESII stands for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information.  
ASCOPE is a similar framework which stands for Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People 
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a traditional PMESII/ASCOPE would list the host nation security forces in an AO. A stability focused 
PMESII/ASCOPE not only lists that information, but also whether the security forces from the area has 




 instability and stability factors (identifying the grievances and resiliencies of the 
local population, key local actors, their ability to foster stability or foment 
instability, and events which could foster in/stability 
 local perceptions 82 
 
Analysis 
 As anyone who has been to a doctor knows, until the malady is diagnosed, the 
doctor cannot prescribe an effective treatment. Similarly, to conduct effective stability 
operations, we need to understand what is causing instability! The analysis phase of the 
DSF compiles the four streams of information gathered in the collection phase and 
analyzes them to identify and prioritize the local sources of instability. This is 
accomplished through a series of worksheets. Practitioners not only identify the 
population‘s priority grievances, but more importantly, whether and how these grievances 
are sources of instability, i.e., do they undermine support for the government, increased 
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questions: ―Have there been changes in the village population in the last year?‖ WHY? ―What are the 
most important problems facing the village?‖ WHY? ―Who do you believe can solve your problems?‖ 
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nation government‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The TCS avoids the problems of other 
surveys by not asking the local population what they ―want or need.‖ Wants and needs are endless and exist 
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it rude to answer ―no‖) to ―yes or no‖ questions. When the TCS is asked over time, the accumulated data 
provides standardized and measureable changes in perceptions. The ―Why‖ question is crucial as it 
provides context. As an illustration, during a DSF field trial in Helmand Province, the British Brigade 
Commander was spending 70% of his time meeting elders because his predecessor told him this was where 
things ―got done.‖ In one region, the population didn‘t identify tribal elders as people who could solve their 
problems (TCS Question #3). The Commander ordered his staff to find out why people didn‘t believe their 
traditional leaders could solve their problems. By analyzing the ―Why‖ responses, the staff discovered the 
Taliban had assassinated senior tribal leaders. Thus the shura leadership consisted of the sons of the elders 
who were young and inexperienced and did not have the same legitimacy as their predecessors.  This 
information would not have been obtained without the TCS. As FM 3-24 ―Counter-Insurgency‖ notes, 
―effective civil-military programming starts with ‗situational awareness‘ based upon facts and an 
understanding of local perceptions.‖ 
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support for insurgents, or undermine the normal functioning of society. This process is 
very different from identifying impediments to development or locating enemy forces. 
 
Design 
After identifying the sources of instability, the next step in the DSF process is to 
design activities to mitigate them. This is accomplished through a series of ―filters.‖ The 
first filter is ―Stability Fundamentals.‖ This means an activity must measurably: 
1.  Increase support for the government 
2.  Decrease support for spoilers  
3.  Increase institutional and/or the community‘s ability to solve societal problems    
If a proposed activity fulfills these three ―Stabilization Fundamentals,‖ the next 
filter ―Stabilization Principles‖ is applied. 83 These are widely accepted best practices for 
designing international programs. They include local ownership, capacity building, 
sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability. 
The goal of the design phase is to create effective projects which mitigate local sources of 
instability. Too often practitioners implement ―feel good‖ projects or even worse, 
projects to show they did ―something‖ during their deployment. Unless activities are 
designed to mitigate sources of instability, at best they will have no effect on stability and 
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Even if practitioners identify the local sources of instability and design 
appropriate mitigating activities, how the activities are implemented plays a crucial role 
in determining whether an activity will foster stability. For example, giving projects to 
one faction in a community will cause resentment from another, fostering instability. 
Funneling money through the wrong contractors or corrupt officials may contribute to 
instability.84  Large influxes of cash can cause inflation and corruption, which hurt the 
poor. The lure of inflated salaries may also draw farmers from their farms, teachers from 
schools, and doctors from clinics—leading to more instability when the projects end. 
 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
To determine their effectiveness in stabilizing an area, practitioners must be able 
to not only measure whether their activities were successful, but also whether their 
activities stabilized the area. Therefore, it is necessary to track three levels of evaluation: 
Measure of Performance (MOP), Measure of Effect, (MOE) and Overall Stability.  
• MOP identifies whether activities have been completed. For example, if the 
objective was to ―increase police support in the community,‖ an activity might 
include police training. The MOP for this activity would be ―police trained.‖ Note 
this simply determines if an activity has been completed, not whether the police 
have more support in the community. 
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• MOE assesses whether the stability program objective(s) has been achieved 
Continuing the police example, an MOE might be more information provided to 
the police by the population.  
• Overall Stability – helps determine whether the net effect of ALL activities has 
improved stability in the area. A basket of standardized stability-focused 
indicators—which can be augmented by a few context area specific indicators—
gives practitioners a good idea if an area is becoming more or less stable. DSF 
stability indicators currently being used in Afghanistan include:   
1. Civilian Night Road Movement 
2. Government Legitimacy 
3. Population Citing Security as an Issue  
4. Population Movement from Insecurity 
5. Enemy Initiated Attacks on Government Security Forces 
6. Civilian Casualties  
7. Acts of Intimidation Against Government Officials 
Note that the number of indicators is not as important as what is being evaluated.85  Since 
the support of the population is the goal for both the government and insurgent forces in a 
Stability Operation, the metrics must focus on (1) whether the population believes 
stability is improving, (2) if their actions reflect their perceptions, and (3) if insurgents 
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Criticism of District Stabilization Framework 
Critics of the DSF believe it does not improve the effectiveness of stability 
operations because:  
a) It is difficult to collect local perceptions 
b) It does not provide a better understanding of the local environment than 
traditional tools 
c) It takes too much time to collect, analyze and disseminate DSF data 
d) The DSF methodology cannot be properly executed in violent environments 
e) It is not linked to a higher level campaign plan and its measures of progress 
Let us examine these criticisms. First, the DSF is too difficult to implement. 
Common complaints include: ―interlocutor fatigue‖ (too much use of the Tactical 
Conflict Survey [TCS] within a small population without doing anything to address the 
sources of instability) and soldiers cannot gather accurate information from the 
population because they will tell armed soldiers ―what they want to hear.‖ The first issue 
is the result of a lack of training. Survey saturation is not a weakness of the DSF 
methodology; it is a shortcoming of those applying it. As for soldiers not being able to 
gather accurate information from locals, two small trials in southern Afghanistan using 
soldiers, foreign nationals, and local NGOs to conduct the TCS found no statistical 
difference in the responses gathered by each group.86 
Another criticism is that the DSF does not provide a better understanding of the 
local environment than traditional tools and processes. The difference between the DSF 
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nationals or local nationals could implement the TCS. 
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and traditional tools is the latter are either focused on identifying the ―needs‖ of the 
population or on identifying the enemy. In other words, they are not focused on 
identifying and diminishing sources of instability. The DSF gives practitioners an 
analytical process, TTPs to implement it, and metrics to evaluate their effectiveness. 





Marines in 2009 learned the lack of cell phone coverage was one of the local population‘s 
principal grievances.  Following up with the ―why‖ question of the Tactical Conflict 
Survey,  the unit discovered cell phone coverage fostered a sense of stability because it 
allowed people to quickly find out about the security situation in neighboring areas 
and/or if attacks had injured family members. Based on this information, the battalion 
and its ANSF partners started providing security for the local cell phone towers. 
Improving the ability of the population to communicate led to an increase in the number 
of tips about IEDs and insurgent movement. Even more significantly, it increased the 
number of people who believed the area was stable. Battalion Commander LTC Bill 
McCollough noted ―This is something we had never thought about, as we considered 
phones a luxury. Without using DSF…we would never have known about this concern, 
understood why it was a concern, or done anything about it.‖87   
Third Battalion 509
th
 Infantry in East Paktika, Afghanistan also used the DSF to 
identify sources of instability. According to the Commander of Bravo Company, the DSF 
process ―allowed me to streamline operations…and prioritized where to focus my efforts 
with what resources I had and it ensured some things that are not quick fixes (most things 
actually) were not forgotten.‖ The battalion‘s Operations Officer noted the DSF allowed 
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―all of our platoon leaders, staffs, company commanders, battalion staff and battalion 
commander to have a good idea of the sources of instability in East Paktika. The 
simplicity, scalability and clarity of the system [DSF] are unmatched.‖ 88  Because of the 
utility of the framework, for the first time the 509
th
 was able to effectively target the 
identified and prioritized sources of instability in their AO.  
         Another concern is the District Stabilization Framework takes too long to 
implement. Practitioners have only a limited time in theater and there is a natural 
inclination to do as much as possible during their deployment. However, implementing 
projects without first indentifying sources of instability can foster the very instability 
practitioners were sent to diminish. Army Field Manual 2.0 ―Intelligence‖ stresses 
―intelligence drives operations.‖  This is true for both lethal and nonlethal operations. If 
practitioners have been educated and trained in the DSF, they can quickly identify local 
SOIs. Using the DSF during their deployment in Afghanistan, the British 52 Brigade was 
able to identify the key sources of instability—which differed throughout the AO—
within a month of their arrival in theater.  
Targeting these SOIs, 52 Brigade was able to see the effects of their activities to 
diminish them, e.g., increasing support for the Afghan Government and decreasing 
support for insurgents, within three months. This improvement in stability was identified 
both qualitatively—through changes in people‘s perceptions garnered with the Tactical 
Conflict Survey and quantitatively (people moving back to their villages, more civilian 
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road movement, decreased security incidents, etc.)89  While a paucity of data makes it 
difficult to discern whether this was causation or correlation, no other unit we are aware 
of can show any direct link between identifying sources of instability, targeting them, and 
measuring effect.  
Critics of the DSF also believe practitioners cannot employ the methodology in 
very violent environments where insurgents have a strong foothold and are thus still 
capable of attacking and intimidating the local population. While traditional collection 
methods may need to be discarded, e.g., such as standing out in the open conducting a 
conversation with a farmer, there are still numerous ways in which to collect public 
perceptions. One is simply to query returning soldiers conducting routine patrols and who 
converse with the local population.  Practitioners may also seek out local NGOs, IOs and 
various other local partners to gather their perspectives on the drivers of instability in the 
area.  In short, creativity and flexibility are required for collecting local perceptions in 
unstable environments. 
Another criticism of the DSF is that while it might measure the effectiveness of 
activities in fostering local stability, the DSF is not linked to higher level strategy and 
measures of effect (MOE). Noteworthy, the vast majority of higher level measures are 
not MOE, but rather measures of performance (MOP), also referred to as outputs.  As 
noted above, MOPs do not measure whether an area is getting more stable, they simply 
indicate if an activity has been implemented. The answer to the larger question of how to 
link local activities to a higher level strategy is in the creation of a flexible strategy which 
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provides a broad outline rather than detailed programmatic goals and their corresponding 
metrics. Units can then prioritize their activities based on the elements of the strategy 
which are relevant to their area of operations instead of being forced to conduct activities 
across a broad spectrum (see next paragraph). The Military Decision-Making Process 
(MDMP) states decisions should be based on ―top-down guidance and bottom up 
refinement.‖ In Afghanistan, there has been little or no bottom up refinement. One reason 
for this phenomenon is the lack of a common interagency methodology which identifies 
local causes of instability for incorporation into national level strategies. The DSF 
provides this capability.  
 A related issue is the importance of having stability focused metrics rather than a 
plethora of irrelevant output indicators.  In 2009, S/CRS led a process to create an 
―Integrated Civilian-Military Support Plan for Afghanistan.‖ It includes eleven 
―Transformative Effects‖ which, if attained, suggest Afghanistan will be stable. To 
measure progress along the way, each Transformative Effect has a series of measurable 
―Main Efforts‖ (95 in total) at the community, province, and national level.‖90 If there are 
ninety-five main efforts, in reality there is no main effort.  In addition to taking a 
significant amount of staff time and field resources to simply gather the requisite data, 
more importantly, most of the main efforts (i.e., focus of effort) are output indicators 
(Measures of Performance) and do not measure whether an area is more stable. There are 
two main reasons for this situation. First, many people do not understand the difference 
between impact (Measure of Effect) and output measures. Second, sources of instability 
                                                 
90
 Karl W. Eikenberry and Stanley A. McChrystal, United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military 
Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (Kabul: U.S. Government, 2010) 
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf (accessed January 17, 2011. 
80 
 
are local.91 None of the higher level plans for stability operations we examined attempted 
to identify local sources of instability before developing Lines of Operations or stability 
MOEs.92 Consequently, the Lines of Effort (LOE) determine the sources of instability 
rather than the sources of instability determining the LOEs. This is a recurring problem as 
plans and indicators are often created either by people who do not understand stability 
operations or by policy-makers, leaders, or practitioners who conflate their values and 
experiences with what locals consider important.  
Most criticism of the DSF comes from those who have not been trained in the 
DSF or who tried to implement it from Power Point presentations. While the DSF is not a 
―silver bullet,‖ it is the only tool which systematically collects the perceptions of the 
population, integrates them into a comprehensive sources of instability analysis, designs 
activities based on this analysis, and measures the effect of the activities in both 
diminishing the SOIs and stabilizing the area.  
 
Benefits of DSF 
The District Stabilization Framework was designed by practitioners to help 
practitioners mitigate challenges to effectively conducting stability operations. 
Consequently, the use of the DSF improves the ability of practitioners to conduct stability 
operations by: 
1) Enabling practitioners to distinguish between Needs, Priority Grievances, and 
Sources of Instability 
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2) Fostering Unity of Effort – through its focus on identifying and mitigating the 
sources of instability, the DSF provides all actors in an area a common view of sources of 
instability  
3) Improving programming – because it provides a common view of the sources 
of instability, the DSF helps practitioners prioritize activities based on their relevance to 
stabilizing an area rather than the practitioners‘ specific ―cylinder of excellence‖ 
4) Measuring stability – since the DSF creates a baseline using standardized, 
population-centric evaluation criterion, it allows practitioners to assess their progress in 
stabilizing an area. 
5) Improving continuity -- since the typical stability operation lasts ten to fifteen 
years, it is crucial to have a process which fosters continuity between deployments. 
Because the DSF identifies the sources of instability and the effectiveness of 
programming to diminish them, it prevents practitioners from ―reinventing the wheel‖ 
6) Empowering field personnel – by using an analytical process to identify the 
local sources of instability, DSF data give practitioners an opportunity to influence 
higher-level planning and decision-making 
7) Reducing staff time and resources devoted to planning – DSF allows the staff 
to focus on what is really important—stabilizing an area, rather than conducting fruitless 
operations and/or implementing ineffective projects  
8) Improving strategic communications – because the DSF identifies the issues 
which matter most to the population, it helps identify Strategic Communication themes 
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which resonate with the population.  What better IO message than ―we understand your 
grievances and here is what we‘re doing to address them.‖93 
Overall, the DSF improves the effectiveness of stability operations because it is 
based on knowledge of the local environment rather than dubious assumptions.  
 
Summary 
As with any theory or doctrine, the District Stabilization Framework does not tell 
field personnel how to conduct stability operations in specific situations. That is the 
responsibility of field personnel. However, it does help overcome the natural tendency of 
practitioners to rely on their own experience, which may or may not be relevant in the 
current environment. In addition, implementing a detailed, population-centric process 
greatly improves the chances of successfully stabilizing an area. This is because it is the 
local population which directly experiences instability and will continue to live in the 
area long after foreigners depart.   
To stabilize an area, two simultaneous processes must occur. First, the sources of 
instability must be identified and mitigated. Second, societal and/or governmental 
capability and capacity to mitigate future sources of instability must be fostered. Simply 
stated, practitioners must diminish the sources of instability while building up the forces 
of stability. This process is the underlying foundation of the District Stabilization 
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population who implemented these projects. This helps the host government achieve greater legitimacy as 
well as take legitimacy from insurgent organizations that frequently claim projects they did not implement. 
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Framework. Although providing guidance for his forces in Afghanistan, the words of the 
Commander of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) apply anywhere in the 
world: ―understand the local grievances and problems that drive instability and take 
action to redress them.‖94 The DSF gives practitioners a tool to accomplish this mission.    
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STILL WAITING AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 
"Insanity is repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results"—
Narcotics Anonymous, 1981 
 
Traditionally, threats to U.S. National Security were defined primarily by 
potential adversaries‘ military capabilities. September 11th fundamentally altered that 
perspective.  Examining the causes of the attacks and the responses required to diminish 
the likelihood of future attacks, the Bush Administration undertook a comprehensive 
national security review. Two significant findings emerged: first, contemporary threats 
facing the United States cannot be mitigated by military force alone and second, it is 
necessary to stabilize weak or failed states in order to diminish the grievances terrorists 
and other spoilers use to mobilize support. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
acknowledged this new international environment. For the first time, fragile states in 
conflict were identified as potential threats to national security. Consequently, 
―stabilizing‖95 these countries became a foreign policy goal. The Obama administration‘s 
May 2010 NSS reiterated this view: ―…we must address the underlying political and 
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economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and 
ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders 
and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.‖96 
The 2002 NSS led to a number of bureaucratic and policy changes. In 2004, the 
Department of State (DoS) established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization (S/CRS). It was charged with ―leading U.S. Government planning to 
help societies transition from conflict or civil strife to a sustainable peace, democracy and 
market economies.‖ In 2005, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
created an Office of Military Affairs. Its mission was to serve as USAID‘s focal point for 
civilian-military planning and interaction with the DoD and foreign militaries. New 
policies were also adopted.  In 2005 the Department of Defense published Directive 
3000.05. It established stability operations as a core U.S. military mission with the same 
priority as combat operations. 
While taking steps in the right direction, the Bush Administration realized without 
integrating the civil and military elements of national power, it could not successfully 
mitigate the amorphous, cross-bureaucracy threats to U.S. security. To that end, it issued 
National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD) in 2005. This Directive designated 
S/CRS as the lead agency for ―coordination, planning, and implementation for 
reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or 
in transition from conflict or civil strife.‖97 These efforts notwithstanding, there is still a 
lack of coordination and integration across departments and agencies: ―the sad reality is 
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that collectively, these departments and agencies represent merely a hodgepodge of 
enterprises that function mostly autonomously—or at least with little shared strategic 
directions.‖98 
The 2010 NSS noted that the U.S. must ―more effectively ensure the alignment of 
resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of 
national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing 
authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other 
policies and programs that strengthen coordination.‖99  
 
Civilian-Military Teams in Vietnam (CORDS) 
Although the attention paid to integrating civilian and military capabilities in 
support of foreign policy goals has been amplified since 9-11, it is not a new 
phenomenon. Civ-mil teams have been deployed numerous times over the years. Perhaps 
the most noted is the CORDS program in Vietnam was CORDS (Civilian Operations and 
Revolutionary-later Rural- Development Support) 
This was the first time the United States Government (USG) attempted to 
combine all of the diverse counterinsurgency activities run by the military, USAID and 
the CIA in one program. Under CORDS, USAID personnel worked in conjunction with 
American and South Vietnamese military and CIA personnel throughout the country, 
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establishing up programs designed to win popular support for the South Vietnamese 
government and to diminish support for the Viet Cong.100 
CORDS was designed and led by Robert Komer. He was personally selected by 
President Johnson because of his strong personality—his nickname was ―Blow Torch 
Bob,‖ and his ability to overcome administrative obstacles.  Identifying bureaucratic 
stovepipes as a major impediment to an integrated civ-mil effort, Komer attempted to 
formally merge various government entities into a single organizational structure. The 
rationale: ―we realistically concluded no one of these [individual agency] plans—
relatively inefficient and wasteful in the chaotic, corrupted Vietnamese wartime 
context—could be decisive. But together they could hope to have a major cumulative 
effect.‖101  CORDS‘ managers were to supervise the formulation and execution of all 
plans, policies and programs, military and civilian, which supported the South 
Vietnamese government‘s development and related programs.102 As one author noted, 
―Komer‘s handiwork ensured him sizable authority not only over seven civilian agencies, 
but he also had considerable say in the mobilization of military resources to support the 
President‘s pacification commitment.‖103   
This novel structure notwithstanding, bureaucratic rivalries continued to limit 
CORDS‘ effectiveness.  Civilian and military organizations did not want to dedicate their 
resources to an interagency program. One observer compared CORDS to a beggar: 
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―CORDS, as such, is an organization in name only. It has no assets of its own; it has no 
authority; it can‘t buy or sell anything. Everything we did out there in the administrative 
operation of CORDS was done through some agency. CORDS had to obtain supplies, 
equipment, and personnel through other agencies, which had an understandable 
reluctance to provide another organization with funds for which they were 
accountable.‖104 
 The effectiveness of the CORDS program was also limited by its inability to 
measure the effect of its activities. Although the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)105 
attempted to quantify and qualify the effectiveness of programs in ―pacifying‖ an area, it 
was considered controversial and too complicated. Another problem was that the HES 
primarily measured preidentified development indicators and security, not whether 
popular support for the government was increasing.106 This approach did not provide an 
opportunity for local input. Consequently, relatively few practitioners used the HES 
metrics to select their programming activities. 
 As one CORDS veteran wrote, ―The intent of these [HES] reports was good, but 
like so many good bureaucratic intentions, the idea was weakest at the point of practical 
application.  I saw DSA‘s [District Senior Advisors] give the reports they should have 
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filled out themselves to their less informed and less experienced 
subordinates.  Sometimes the instructions would be to just fill in the blanks with anything 
that seemed reasonable. Meeting the deadline for submission of the report was the 
important thing, not accuracy.  Often reports on hamlets were filled in when the hamlet 
had never been seen by the DSA or any of his team members.  Instead of a firsthand look, 
the overworked DSA might take the word or opinion of a local Vietnamese official about 
the situation in some remote hamlet.  While the Vietnamese colleague might in fact know 
of the situation in that hamlet, his motives in giving an opinion might have been viewed 
with some skepticism.‖107 
Closely linked to inappropriate metrics was the lack of a common interagency 
planning and assessment framework. In other words, the lack of a standardized, tactical 
framework which would help field practitioners identify local sources of instability 
(SOI), develop programming to mitigate them, and measure the effectiveness of the 
programs in stabilizing the area. Although the HES attempted to assess the effectiveness 
of CORDS‘ programming, since its indicators were not linked to local SOIs, they did not 
measure whether an area was becoming more stable. 
As an illustration, if a new school was built, this would be considered a measure 
of success. However, if the Viet Cong were gaining support in an area because of corrupt 
local officials, a new school would not foster sustainable local stability. In general the 
CORDS program operated under the principle ―if you do good things, good things will 
happen.‖ The lack of a standardized, stability focused planning and assessment 
framework resulted in the misapplication of limited resources and continuing instability.  
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The CORDS‘ centralized management system allowed for the more efficient use 
of multiagency resources and personnel than in previous civ-mil operations. 
Consequently, and despite an overwhelming focus on lethal operations by the military, 
CORDS was able to ―pacify‖ various parts of the country.108 This success 
notwithstanding, the overall effectiveness of CORDS as a model for civ-mil integration 
was limited by bureaucratic stovepipes, metrics focused on output, and the lack of an 
assessment methodology which identified and targeted local sources of instability.  
 
Civilian-Military Teams Today 
The current iteration of civilian-military teams is the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq. The deployment of PRTs represents a continuing 
belief successful stability operations require integrated civ-mil teams. First deployed in 
Afghanistan in 2002, PRTs are small ―interim civil-military organizations designed to 
operate in semi-permissive environments following open hostilities. The PRT is intended 
to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation‘s capacity; 
reinforcing the host nation‘s legitimacy and effectiveness; and bolstering that the host 
nation can provide security to its citizens and deliver essential government services.‖109  
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While PRTs have had some success,110 overall they have not fostered effective 
civil-military integration or stabilized the areas where they operate. The reasons would be 
familiar to a CORDS‘ District Advisors working in Vietnam thirty-five years ago: an 
inability to overcome bureaucratic interests, an emphasis on measuring output rather than 
effect, and not using a standardized stability assessment and planning framework to link 
and sync the civilian and military activities.
111
 The PRT handbook notes: ―a PRT 
stabilizes an area through its integrated civilian-military focus. It combines the 
diplomatic, military, and developmental components of the various agencies involved in 
the stabilization and reconstruction effort.‖112 However, their effectiveness has suffered 
from personality differences, agency cultures, agency funding and personnel imbalances, 
and differing agency objectives and timelines.113 As one Iraq PRT veteran wrote, ―While 
the State Department was the lead Federal agency for reconstruction and stabilization, the 
BCTs we were embedded with had their own separate agendas.‖114 
 In terms of measuring the effect, PRTs have yet to field an objective, standardized 
framework to assess whether their activities are stabilizing an area. While the HES was 
controversial, at least it was a consistent framework which attempted to measure overall 
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―effect.‖115  In contrast, PRT metrics are based on measuring output along predetermined 
―Lines of Activity‖ (LOA).116  Ironically, the PRT Handbook stresses the importance of 
measuring effect rather than simply recording the number of projects.117 Nevertheless, as 
with the HES, PRT metrics do not identify the local sources of instability from the 
perspective of the population or include all the relevant information from local 
practitioners. As an illustration, the system used to measure PRT effectiveness in Iraq 
(The Maturity Model); focused on measuring increases in civil capacity, not whether 
stability was increasing. In other words, it did not measure whether the government was 
legitimate or if local support for insurgents was decreasing. Other problems were a focus 
on the provincial level and an inability to change irrelevant metrics dictated by Bagdad.   
Realizing these shortcomings, in December 2009, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq issued 
new guidance mandating PRTs focus on ―outcomes‖ rather than merely improving Iraqi 
provincial government capacity as assessed by the Maturity Model.  The policy guidance 
noted: ―The PRT mission in each province must be shaped not by a single analytical tool 
but by the JCP [Civ-mil Joint Common Plan], existing security situation, Iraqi 
willingness to cooperate, PRT resources, and other events on the ground in each 
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province.‖118 Although a step forward, the guidance was too broad and subjective, did not 
require Iraqi input in the development of indicators, focused on USG priorities, and 
lacked standardized indicators.  
The lack of a standardized stability baseline created by identifying local sources 
of instability rather than dictates from above continues to foster ad hoc planning and 
programming. More importantly, it prevents civ-mil teams from measuring whether or 
not stability is increasing. This situation is amplified by the structure of PRTs. While it 
was hoped an interagency civ-mil organization would foster integrate programming, in 
most cases this hope has been negated by home agency cultures, time horizons, and 
perspectives.   
Without a common understanding of the local sources of instability, civ-mil teams 
will continue to replicate past failures.  These recurring challenges point to the need for a 
standardized, tactical, interagency framework to identify local sources of instability, 
develop programming to mitigate them, and measure the effectiveness of the programs in 
stabilizing the area. 
 
The District Stability Framework 
Recognizing the need for a standardized, comprehensive methodology to foster 
effective civ-mil operations, USAID‘s Office of Military Affairs led an effort to 
overcome this challenge.  The result was the District Stability Framework (DSF). The 
DSF helps civilian and military personnel identify and target local causes of instability. 
Utilizing significant elements of USAID‘s Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning 
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Framework (TCAPF) and military planning tools such as ASCOPE119 and PMESII,120 the 
DSF is an adaptive tool which can be used in unstable environments where civ-mil teams 
might be deployed.  
 
The District Stability Framework: Four Phases 
The DSF offers a common platform for collaboration and joint planning, within 
and across the interagency.  It provides a nuanced understanding of the environment 
through the utilization of four lenses (operational, cultural, popular perceptions, and the 
dynamics of stability and instability) to gain population-centric situational awareness.  
This information drives the analysis phase which identifies local sources of instability.  
Once identified, the design phase develops activities to diminish the sources of 
instability. Perhaps most significantly, the DSF measures the impact of activities in 
stabilizing an area, not simply the number of dollars spent or number of projects 
completed.  This allows for the real-time monitoring and evaluation of activities to 
determine whether they should be continued, ended, or increased.  
The DSF methodology has three significant advantages: First, it focuses on 
identifying and prioritizing local sources of instability. Second, it gives practitioners the 
ability to continually monitor and measure activities, allowing them to be adjusted as 
required. Third, the DSF has standardized stability impact indicators which assess overall 
stability trends with qualitative and quantitative measures.  These features are unique to 
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the DSF and give civ-mil teams a comprehensive tool with which to conduct stability 
missions. 
 
Fostering Effective Civil-Military Integration 
Mandating the use of an interagency stabilization framework like DSF would be a 
significant step in reducing the challenges facing civ-mil teams. Gaining a holistic 
understanding of the causes of instability in an area requires both civilian and military 
skill sets. For example, integrating intelligence and civil information not only identifies 
local spoilers, but also resiliencies – the processes, relationships, and institutions that 
enable a society to function and regulate itself peacefully.  Once resiliencies are 
identified, they can be strengthened to negate destabilizing forces.  The DSF was 
designed to bring together the best aspects of military planning and civilian analysis to 
develop an understanding of the complex operating environments in which civ-mil teams 
operate. 
The effectiveness of this approach can be seen in Helmand, Afghanistan.  In the 
summer of 2009 the Marine Corps moved into Nawa District. Trained in DSF, taking a 
population-centric approach, and supported by a small team of USG civilians, the 
Marines worked closely with Afghanistan Government officials and community leaders 
to stabilize the area. Every patrol was told to build relationships with locals, listen to their 
concerns, and take visible action to address priority community grievances. In addition to 
living with and partnering with the Afghan National Police, the Marines initiated a 
comprehensive vetting and training program to ameliorate police corruption, a priority 
grievance of the population.  In a matter of months the security situation improved to 
such an extent the Marines no longer wore their personal protective equipment in the 
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crowded bazaar area. This combination of identifying local sources on instability, 
working with the population to mitigate them, building local capability and capacity, and 
creating a base line to measure effect led to stability in Nawa. 
 
Overcoming the Challenges with the DSF 
To be effective, civ-mil teams must be able to synchronize and prioritize effort 
across agencies.  However, bureaucratic stovepipes—different agency objectives and 
timelines--make integration difficult.  Because DSF is an interagency framework which 
focuses on instability, it helps break down bureaucratic stovepipes and fosters effective 
civ-mil collaboration. This is facilitated by the DSF‘s emphasis on the creation of 
―Stability Working Groups (SWG).‖  
SWGs should include representatives from the different actors working in an area: 
DoD, USAID, DoS, USDA etc. Each brings unique perspectives on the environment, 
different capabilities and capacities to address sources of instability, and knowledge of 
ongoing programs. When possible, representatives from the host nation and local 
stakeholders such as civil society organizations, community groups, NGO‘s, or interested 
citizens should participate in SWGs.  The SWG becomes a coordination mechanism and 
synchronizes efforts of the various actors operating in the area. In addition to gaining 
local perspectives regarding the sources of instability, inclusion of these diverse 
participants in the process facilitates the development and/or strengthening of community 
and governmental capability and capacity. This fosters long-term stability.  
Since the DSF is focused on fostering stability, it emphasizes measuring the 
effectiveness of civ-mil activities. Military commanders and civilian program managers 
too often conflate output measures (the number of activities completed or dollars spent) 
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with impact (is ―the area more stable?‖)  For example, many implementers believe job 
creation programs stabilize an area because they assume gainfully employed men are less 
likely to join or support the spoilers who benefit from instability. Therefore, spending a 
lot of money on jobs programs is viewed as a ―success.‖ However the number of jobs 
created is an output measure which tells us nothing about the behavior of young men. A 
stability measure of effect would be a reduction in the number of men joining armed 
groups. Although it is much easier to track and report output, it has little to do with 
stability. 
Implementing the DSF would help shift the focus to identifying and targeting 
local sources of instability.  For example, project funds would not be allocated until a 
source of instability—and the desired end state—had been identified and confirmed 
through the DFS framework.  In eastern Afghanistan, USAID‘s Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI) is using this approach.  Before approving an activity, OTI requires the 
implementer to show how a proposed activity is tied to a source of instability. While this 
process is still relatively new, initial reports indicate the use of the DSF has slowed 
spending and improved the effectiveness of programming.  
In summary, the DSF can diminish some of the key challenges facing civ-mil 
teams as they attempt to conduct effective, integrated, operations.  It would help prevent 
expansive mission statements such as ―build the capacity of provincial government‖ from 
leading to a plethora of projects in variety of areas, from agriculture to justice. Since 
these projects do not target SOIs, in many cases, they actually foster instability.121 The 
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DSF combats this tendency through a standardized, tactically focused, interagency 
methodology which identifies local sources of instability, develops programming to 
mitigate them, and measures the effectiveness of the programs in stabilizing the area. 
 
Fostering Civ-Mil Integration Across the Intervention Spectrum 
Because it is focused on identifying and diminishing local sources of instability, 
the DSF can be used by civ-mil teams in a variety of environments and missions, from 
humanitarian assistance to conflict prevention. As an illustration, although the goals of 
humanitarian assistance--saving lives, alleviating suffering, and minimizing the economic 
costs of conflict, disasters, and displacement—are clear, identifying and prioritizing 
activities which will save lives and prevent further instability are not. Too often, 
assumptions are made regarding the types of perishable or nonperishable goods affected 
populations require. After the onset of an emergency, well-meaning international donors 
and NGOs often provide warehouses full of clothes and supplies when soap and jerry 
cans are the critical items required to stave off disease. Shipping in large quantities of the 
wrong supplies can do more harm than good by clogging airports and ports, thus delaying 
the provision of emergency supplies desperately needed to save lives. 
Another common problem with the provision of humanitarian assistance involves 
the centralization of aid in easily assessable locations near large cities or major 
displacement camps. Affected populations in rural areas or more difficult to reach 
locations often receive only limited assistance.  This encourages migrations of people in 
need to areas where assistance is being delivered.  The devastating 2010 earthquake 
which struck Haiti illustrates this point. Humanitarian aid was largely concentrated in 
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Port-au-Prince leaving rural areas, only hours from the capital, in dire need.122  Not only 
did this contribute to overcrowding as people sought relief in Port-au-Prince, it also 
overwhelmed the ability of the international community and host nation to respond. This 
limited the effectiveness of relief efforts and increased instability. Using an interagency 
stabilization framework based on the DSF could mitigate these problems. The DSF 
includes a simple survey tool to gather local perceptions. Systemically collecting local 
perceptions and including them in an analysis of where assistance should be provided 
would foster more effective responses.  
The DSF can also be used as a conflict prevention tool. Traditional development 
programs seek to address traditional development challenges like poverty, social issues 
(i.e., education, health care), infrastructure, governance, etc. and monitor them according 
to standard metrics for that specific sector.  These programs may have second-order 
effects on stability, but a stability analysis is not usually included in the planning process. 
For example, a microfinance program conducted in an unstable environment which does 
not seek to address drivers of conflict through its activities would be ineffective as it 
would foster instability. As every practitioner knows, instability is the biggest obstacle to 
sustainable development. In areas under the influence or control of spoilers, it is not 
uncommon for development contracts and resources to flow through their hands. This 
reinforces instability and undermines legitimate governance.   
 Although development programs have different objectives and metrics than 
stability-focused programs, using the DSF to identify civil vulnerabilities and potential 
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sources of instability would foster sustainable development. For example, militant groups 
operating in northern Mali gain popular support because of popular disillusionment with 
the government.123 The resulting instability limits the ability of development practitioners 
to work in the area. Understanding the specific reason for the disillusionment 
(grievances) of the people combined with knowledge of the means and motivations of the 
militants would lead to focused activities which could both decrease instability and foster 
long-term development. 
 
Obstacles to DSF Implementation 
Although developed by USAID, DSF training is far more prevalent at military 
training centers than within USAID and DoS training programs.  Bureaucratic culture is 
one of the primary reasons why the military has taken the lead in using the DSF. In 
contrast to their civilian counterparts, DoD is generally more practically focused and 
seeks simple, but effective tactical tools.  Civilian officials often take a longer view and 
generally operate at higher levels. As an illustration, with exceptions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq--and in contrast to their military counterparts, USAID and DoS officers do not 
usually work directly with communities in unstable areas. USAID typically implements 
programs through NGOs and for-profit development firms which are evaluated on the 
amount and rate they provide ―deliverables‖ and spend money (―burn rates‖), not the 
effectiveness of their program in stabilizing an area. 
Bureaucratic culture also limits the military‘s use of DSF.  Even though DoD has 
issued training guidance which states that ―stability operations are a core U.S. military 
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mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency 
equivalent to combat operations‖ and that ―Integrated civilian and military efforts are 
essential to the conduct of successful stability operations,‖ implementation of this 
training directive varies by unit.124 Without adequate civ-mil training for both civilian and 
military personnel, the success of civ-mil operations will continue to be the result of luck 
and/or ad hoc approaches.  
Civilian entities face a similar challenge. Without leadership forcing the design 
and implementation of programs suited for unstable environments, program managers 
will continue to design top-down development programs based on sectors (health, 
education, infrastructure, agriculture, democracy and governance, etc.), not the flexible, 
cross-sectoral bottom-up stability programs required to target the sources of instability.   
 
Conclusion 
To stabilize failed or failing states, the U.S. has to identify and mitigate the 
conditions that foster instability. It needs to effectively integrate civil and military 
capabilities, define a common methodology to identify local sources of instability, devise 
and implement activities to diminish them, and measure their effectiveness in stabilizing 
the area. Without a common field-based methodology, the challenges noted above will 
continue to impede the USG‘s ability to create the conditions for lasting stability. 
Noteworthy, the challenge of integrating USG capabilities and capacities into effective 
civ-mil teams would be just as familiar to a District Advisor working in Vietnam in 1967 
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as it would to Field Program Officer at a PRT today.  One author noted ―many of the 
lessons learned in Vietnam were relearned in Iraq…‖125 
The USG has slowly started to alter its approach to weak and failing states.  The 
military has created new doctrine (FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency; FM 3-07, Stability 
Operations) which provides an understanding of, and guidelines for, operating in these 
complex environments. On the civilian side USAID recently published guidance noting:  
―Stabilization is a different development assistance approach. While stability is a 
necessary precursor for our long-term development goals, stabilization programming 
often has different objectives, beneficiaries, modalities, and measurement tools than long-
term development programming.‖126 The challenge has been to take doctrine and 
guidance and turn it into practice.  Mandating the use of the interagency District Stability 
Framework will help improve the effectiveness of civ-mil operations and improve the 
capability of the USG to diminish the causes of instability, from the Philippines to the 
Horn of Africa.
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American has a long and robust experience with irregular warfare.  It is no 
stranger to insurgency or counterinsurgency.  In fact America was born of insurgency and 
has remained engaged in such irregular endeavors for centuries.  It may even be argued 
that America is as much shaped by irregular conflict, such as the Indian Wars or 
Vietnam, as it is from conventional wars, such as the Civil War or World War II.   
However, America has had mixed results with irregular war.  Before the modern 
age of irregular warfare, as identified with Mao‘s arrival, America had relative success in 
irregular war utilizing overwhelming military force to beat the adversary into submission.  
However, once modern insurgency emerged, with its notions of harnessing the 
adversary‘s strength and turning perceived strengths into weaknesses, America has since 
struggled.  Once Mao demonstrated that a weaker side can emerge victorious, America 
soon thereafter lost in Vietnam and attempted to avoid large-scale overt 
counterinsurgency warfare thereafter.  However, history eventually pulled the U.S. back 
into large irregular war following September 11
th
, and the U.S. entered Iraq and 
Afghanistan in large scale soon to be confronted with large number of insurgents.  
America responded after years of floundering in both countries, rewriting and re-
evaluating the entire approach to counterinsurgency.  However, still the conclusion of 
both Iraq and Afghanistan are in doubt despite the major shifts in approach.  While Iraq 
seems to be winding down with only relatively minor violence still at play, Afghanistan‘s 
insurgency appears to still remain strong. 
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The rethinking of irregular warfare has pushed new thoughts in irregular war.  
One such emerging thought is that the U.S. needs to better understand how to actually 
perform counterinsurgency.  Throughout America‘s history in counterinsurgency, 
methodology was ad hoc at best, and performed in stilted fashion by layers of individuals 
as they rotated in and out of theater.  But new methodology demonstrated a new and 
better approach, summarizing ―best practices‖ from history, and advocating that 
understanding of the local people and their grievances was paramount to achieving 
success in irregular war.  This methodology argues that you must focus on the local 
levels, have a comprehensive approach to uncover ―sources of instability,‖ and that all 
organizations must synchronize for the sake of enhanced continuity and synchronization.  
Further, the emerging methodology has not only consequences for irregular warfare, but 
also transcends beyond conflicts, potentially assisting in humanitarian intervention and 
preconflict environments.  In other words, this new methodology argues that it is in 
everyone‘s interest to understand and mitigate conflict before local conflicts become 
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